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INTRODUCTION

One day Henny Penny was eating corn in the farmyard when...
whacd ... an acorn fell on her head. "Oh, my," said Henny Penny.
"The sky is falling! The sky is falling. I must go and tell the King."
So she went along and she went along and she went along until
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she met Cocky Locky. "Hello, Henny Penny," said Cocky Locky.
"Where are you going?" "The sky is falling and I must go and tell
the King," said Henny Penny. "Ohl May I go with you?" asked
Cocky Locky. "Certainlyl" said Henny Penny. So they went along
and they went along and they went along until they met Ducky
Lucky. "Hello, Henny Penny and Cocky Locky," said Ducky Lucky.

"Where are you going?" 'The sky is falling and we must go and tell
the King," said Henny Penny and. Cocky Locky. 'Oh! May I go with
you?" asked Ducky Lucky. "Certainlyl" said Henny Penny and
Cocky Locky. So they went along and they went along and they
went along until they met Goosey Loosey. "Hello, Henny Penny,
Cocky Locky and Ducky Lucky," said Goosey Loosey. "Where are
you going?" "The sky is falling and we must go and tell the King,"
said Henny Penny, Cocky Locky and Ducky Lucky. 'Oh! May I go
with you?" asked Goosey Loosey. "Certainly!" said Henny Penny,
Cocky Locky and Ducky Lucky. So they went along and they went
along and they went along until they met Turkey Lurkey. "Hello,
Henny Penny, Cocky Locky, Ducky Lucky and Goosey Loosey," said
Turkey Lurkey. 'Where are you going?" "The sky is falling and we
must go and tell the King," said Henny Penny, Cocky Locky, Ducky
Lucky and Goosey Loosey. "Ohl May I go with you?" asked Turkey
Lurkey. 'Certainlyl" said Henny Penny, Cocky Locky, Ducky Lucky
and Goosey Loosey. So they went along and they went along and
they went along until they met Foxy Loxy. "Greetings, Henny
Penny, Cocky Locky, Ducky Lucky, Goosey Loosey and Turkey
Lurkey," said Foxy Loxy. 'Where are you going?" "The sky is
falling and we must go and tell the King." said Henny Penny, Cocky
Locky, Duckey Lucky, Goosey Loosey and Turkey Lurkey. "Youll
never get there in time," said Foxy Loxy. "Come with me and I'l
show you the shortcut." "Certainly!" said Henny Penny, Cocky
Locky, Ducky Lucky, Goosey Loosey and Turkey Lurkey. And they
followed Foxy Loxy right into his cave. Henny Penny, Cocky Locky,
Ducky Lucky, Goosey Loosey and Turkey Lurkey were never seen
1
again... and no one ever told the King the sky was falling."

When recently asked what actions were underway in
preparation for the Year 2000 (Y2K) computer bug, a director of a
leading French bank proclaimed: "The Year 2000 question is a
conspiracy cooked up by the Americans and the British to create
a smokescreen and distract attention away from preparations for

1.
This old tale is often told with a protagonist named Chicken Litt/H. WERNER ZIMMERMAN, HENNY PENNY (1989). A fable offers a similar admonishment:
A Stag, blind of one eye, was grazing close to the sea-shore and kept his
sound eye turned towards the land, so as to be able to perceive the

approach of the hounds, while the blind eye he turned towards the sea,
never suspecting that any danger would threaten him from that quarter.
As it fell out, however, some sailors, coasting along the shore, spied him
and shot an arrow at him, by which he was mortally wounded. As he lay
dying, he said to himself, 'Wretch that I aml I bethought me of the
dangers of the land, whence none assailed me: but I feared no peril from
the sea, yet thence has come my ruin.
"Misfortune often assails us from an unexpected quarter."
AESOP, The Stag With One Eye, in AEsoP'S FABLES (V.S. Vernon Jones trans., 1967).
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the single European currency." 2
This Euro-envy conspiracy
theory appears disingenuous: a 1998 survey projected that only
one percent of French firms were going to fail to account for the
Y2K Bug problem by January 1, 1999. 3 However, the same
survey predicted that seventy-four percent of German firms were
going to fail to meet the Y2K deadline. 4 Other surveys conclude
that companies in the United States and Australia are blazing
ahead of others in their battle against the Y2K Bug. s
Yet,
Canadian, British, Israeli, Swedish, French, Italian, Japanese,
and German firms lag behind the United States and Australia at a
rate of six to eighteen months. 6 Developing countries, suffering
from pirated software and aging hardware, will most likely feel the
bite of the Bug before it even arrives.7 Indeed, multinational
businesses have begun to demand advance payment for goods
because the effects of Y2K in developing nations will most likely

2.
The Millennium Bug Survey: Countries that Count, ECONOMIST, Sept 19,
1998, at 13. The French director may not have been so cavalier had he known of
the $13 million hit a New Zealand aluminum smelter endured after its software
could not recognize a leap year. See David Jordan, The Year 2000 Assessment
Process, 521 PLI/PAT 73, 76 (June, 1998). However, there exist other Y2K
naysayers.
At the denial extreme, we have astronomer Clifford Stoll, author of the
high-tech critique Silicon Snake OMlwho in a January 1, 1997, debate with
Y2K consciousness-raiser Peter de Jager claimed that the Year 2000
problem can be fixed in a long weekend, and chief information officer
David Starr of Reader's Digest Association, who told Computerworld in
mid-1997 that Y2K is a fraud. Even more stringently, Jim Wilson, the
science editor of Popular Mechanics, has dismissed Y2K as an urban

legend, apparently on the grounds that the computer industry couldn't
possibly be that stupid.
Wendy M. Grossman, The End of the World as We Know It (visited Oct. 9, 1998)
<http://www.sciam.com/1998/1098issue/1098cyber.html>.
3.
See The Millennium Bug Survey: Are You ReadyP, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19,
1998, at 10.
4.
See id. However, the article points out the following anomaly in the
survey results: "Year 2000 work will account for 90% of annual IT budgets in
Germany and only 20% in France. Does that mean the French are wildly
underestimating their problems? Or that Germany faces the bigger task?" Id.
5.
See id. Another study found that "71% of U.S. private and public
entities have a formal Year 2000 program in place, while in Asia that number
drops to 63%, and in Europe it drops even further to 57%." Stephen J. Schulte,
The Year 2000 Problem: A Technological Time Bomb, 1046 PLI /CORP 705, 712
(April, 1998) (citing Borzou Daragahi, Survey: Firms Outside U.S. Lag in Y2K
Readiness, SEC. INDUS. NEWS, Dec. 22, 1997, at 3).
6.
See id. Japan uses not only conventional calendar dating but the
emperor system as well. The emperor system uses two digits, which may alleviate
some of the pressures firms feel as the impending Year 2000 approaches. See id.
at 15.
7.
See The Millennium Bug Survey: No Hiding Place, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19,
1998, at 14.
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be severe. 8 Such disparities in our global marketplace will force
international players to address not only their own Y2K problems,

but those of their trading partners as well. Specifically, parties to
an international supply chain must acknowledge that their Y2K
readiness is only as effective as the chain's weakest link. 9 That
weak link could result in contractual liability, and there appears
to be no lack of liability to go around.10

8.

See id For example, the Indonesian telephone company and electricity

board expect to beat the Y2K deadline. However, the water company has yet to
begin Y2K preparations. See id.
9.
See Schulte, supranote 5, at 710.
With a year to go before 2000, Montgomery Ward & Co. systems guru
Morton Mease says he's confident the Chicago-based retail chain's
computers will be free of Millennium Bugs. It's everybody else's computers
that worry him. In his worst nightmares, Mease envisions stores being
looted if Year 2000-induced power failures knock out lights and alarms.
He frets about apparel plants in Asia standing idle if fabric shipments
suffer Year 2000 delays. And he trembles at the thought of merchandise
getting stranded by the truckload in small town U.S.A. if Year 2000 snafus
[Tihe systems of vendors and
disable fuel stations and the like ....
clients are beginning to take center stage, as companies recognize that
outside problems could cripple their businesses just as thoroughly as
internal failures.
Greg Burns, Your Systems Might Be Y2K Compliant, But What About Your
Suppliers, Customers?, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM (last updated Dec. 31, 1998)
<http://www.startext.net/news/doc/1047/ l:COMP52/ 1:COMP52123198.html>.
10.
Y2K litigation began in the summer of 1997 with Produce Palace
Internationalv. Tec-America, a case which involved a commercial plaintiff suing for
losses resulting from cash register failures to read credit cards with expiration

dates beyond 1999. The case settled "on September 10, 1998 for $250,000 and
hardware and a service contract" Legislators are scrambling to pass bills limiting
Y2K liability. ITAA's Year 2000 Program. Year 2000 Law Suits (Filed & 'Potential")

(visited Oct. 9, 1998) <http://www.itaa.org/Y2Klaw.htm>.
Additionally, in response to Y2K concerns and to boost investor confidence,
the SEC published an Interpretive Release concerning Y2K issues. See generally
Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and
Consequences of Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies
and Municipal Securities Issuers, 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241, 271, 276 (1998);
James R. Doty, The SEC Talks About Y2K: Agency Issues a Release to Guide
Reporting Obligations, Bus. L. TODAY, November/December 1998, at 46, 46
(stating that the release "carries the force of a commission vote on specific
interpretations of disclosure policies"); SEC Homepage (visited Jan. 18, 1999)
<http://www.sec.gov>. To find support for the release, see Reports To Be Made
by Certain Brokers and Dealers, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (1998); Year 2000 Readiness
Reports To Be Made by Certain Transfer Agents, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240; Staff Legal
60,005, at 50,115 (superseded by
Bulletin No. 5, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and
Consequences of Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies
and Municipal Securities Issuers, supra).
The release outlines disclosure policies for public companies and reiterates
the safe harbors for forward-looking statements made in such disclosures'
designated in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. A public
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The projected cost of globally remedying the Y2K problem
ranges from $300 billion to $600 billion.' 1
Add the cost of
lawyers and the estimate surges to $1 trillion. 12 Like a modem
version of Cinderella, when the clock strikes midnight on January
1, 2000, many will scurry to find their prince charming of legal
remedies.13 This paper addresses one such possibility vis-a-vis
failures in the supply chain by examining the doctrines of
impossibility and impracticability within the contexts of American
and international contract law. Part II explains the origins of the
Y2K Bug and possible results on January 1, 2000. Part III

company must disclose information related to its Y2K readiness if one of two tests
is met (i) if a company has not completed its Y2K assessment or (ii) if
management concludes that Y2K problems could arise, without accounting for
any endeavors the company has taken to prevent Y2K problems. See Doty, supra,
at 49. The latter test is quite broad, encompassing most public companies. "If
disclosure is required under that test, the SEC believes that full and fair
disclosure includes: the company's state of readiness; the costs of addressing the
company's Year 2000 issues; the risks of the company's Y2K issues; and the
company's contingency plans." Id. at 48. Additionally, in addressing an issue
particularly relevant to this paper, "[ejach company is also directed to consider

whether its own Y2K circumstances require MD&A disclosure of additional
information." Most importantly, in the SEC's view, a company's assessment will
not be complete unless the company has considered third-party relationships
(including vendor, supplier, and customer relationships), and has taken
reasonable steps to verify the Y2K readiness of any third party that could cause a
material impact. Id.
A company that makes forward-looking statements based on third-party
representations will fall within the statutory safe harbors of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See id. at 50.
The release also addresses disclosure issues that investment advisers,
investment companies, and municipal issuers confront. See generally Statement
of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences
of Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies and Municipal
Securities Issuers, supra;Doty, supra, at 50-51.
11.
See Deborah L. Bayles, Preventing an Infestation of the Millennium Bug,
COLO. LAw., Oct. 26, 1997, at 123.
12.
See The Millennium Bug Survey: Midnight's Children, ECONOMIST, Sept.
19, 1998, at 15. Some commentators predict that legal costs resulting from the
Y2K Bug will reach a mere $100 billion. See Howard L. Nations, et al., The
Multiple Roles of Launjers in Coping with the Fallout from the Trillion-Dollar
Computer Glitch, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILLENNIUM BUG: 2000 (State Bar of
Tex., 21st Ann. Adv. Civ. Trial Course), at K-2.
13.
Actually, there are several critical dates that precede January 1, 2000.
September 1, 1999 begins the federal government's fiscal year 2000. September
9, 1999 (09/09/99) is a date used by many systems as a default date. For
example, data concerning prisoners are entered on computer information sheets,
including their respective dates of release. The date of release for lifers and death
row inhabitants is entered 09/09/99. Another critical date is February 29, 2000.
The Year 2000 is a "super leap year" which essentially means that February 29,
2000 will be a day that occurs only every four hundred years. Computers that
cognize the date 01/01/00 may not recognize that the Year 2000 is a leap year,
resulting in more complications. See Nations et al., supranote 12, at K-6-K-7.

352

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:34 7

examines the doctrine of impracticability in the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Section 2-615 within the context of
Y2K problems. 14 Part IV considers the international treaty of the
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) within the
Y2K context.1 5 Part V concludes that when courts address Y2K
failures they should apply a negligence standard rather than the
standard under traditional contract law.
II. THE Y2K MILLENNIUM BUG
The Y2K problem presents a two-fold challenge. First, older
computer systems, by and large, recognize calendar years in a two
digit form. 16 For example, the computer reads "98" as 1998.
When 2000 arrives, computers will assume that "00" represents
the year 1900 as opposed to the year 2000.17 Not having any
work assigned on January 1, 1900, the computer will be unable
to function. Alternatively, the computer will continue to function
18
but will make significant miscalculations.

14.
See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1995). Part III will also briefly address the
American common law doctrine of impossibility.
15.
See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, 19 I.L.M. 671 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5528
(1992)) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG].
16.
See The Millennium Bug Survey: Time Runs Out, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19,
1998, at 1.
17.
See Nations et al., supra note 12, at K-2. The Millennium itself
purportedly arrived around 1997, although computers, like most people, failed to
recognize it:
Whenever the millennium is, it's not really next year, even if that's when
just about everybody will be marketing it .

.

.

. [B]y more careful

calculations, the millennium began a few years ago. A large part of the
misunderstanding stems from Dionysius Exiguus-Latin for 'Dennis the
Short'--a 6th century monk who should be thought of as the original
millennium bug. Dennis laid down the basis for the calendars we use
today by figuring how far in the past Christ's birth was. As it turns out, he
was off by several years. Historians now place the Nativity no later than 4
B.C., the year King Herod died. By that reckoning, the 3rd millennium
would have commenced no later than 1997.
Richard Lacayo, The End of the World As We Know It?, TIME, Jan. 18, 1999, at 60,
62.
18.
See Schulte, supra note 5, at 709. Miscalculations can cause lasting
headaches. One couple experienced trouble when their insurance company
installed Y2K-compliant software which "garbled date entries and miscalculated
insurance premiums." As a result, their credit card was charged a total of
$17,800. Additionally, U.C.C. filings have been affected. The Metropolitan
National Bank of Springfield discovered that one of its liens had disappeared
since, instead of expiring in 2001, the computer read the lien as expiring in 1901.
See Finn Bullers & David Hayes, In KC, Some Already Have Seen What Glitches
Can Do, THE STAR (visited Oct. 15, 1998) <http://www.kcstar.com/item/pages/
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The second problem is that the Year 2000 is a "super leap
year."19 Leap years occur every four years except those years
ending in "00." However, "to compensate for a minor discrepancy
in time that develops over the centuries, there is a super leap year
in each year that is divisible by [four hundred]." 2 0 Thus, the
computers that survive January 1 may fail to account for

February 29, resulting in a belated Millennium Bug bite identical
to that expected on January 1, 2000.21
The essential question is why did programmers chose the two
digit form for calendar years as opposed to the four digit form?
The answer is rather simple-money. In the early days of
computer programming, computer memory was a precious
commodity. "[O]ne megabyte of magnetic disk storage (enough for
a solid novel) in 1965 was $761, compared with seventy-five cents
today 11998] and perhaps thirty-four cents in 2000. "22 When one
adjusts those numbers for inflation, the comparison becomes

y2k.pat,business/30da66a1.926,.html>.
19.
See Nations et al., supranote 12, at K-7.
20.
See id. at K-7. Additionally, January 1, 2000, is the date that the
European Common Market introduces the Eurodollar. At least in Europe, this
presents additional difficulties come 2000. See id.
21.
This programming problem seems relatively simple to remedy, and it
is. However, consider this statement by Paloma O'Riley of the Cassandra Project:
Well, actually, the [Y2K] problem itself is technically very simple. What the
catch is we've waited too long to start working on it. It's kind of like the
Golden Gate Bridge. If you told a worker to remove and replace a rivet on
the bridge, that's very easy to do. It hardly takes any time at all. But if
you told the worker that he needs to change out all the rivets on the bridge
and he only has 48 hours to do it, that's a problem.
The Year 2000 Bug: Time to Sound the Alarm, or Just a Lot of Hype? (ABC
television broadcast, Oct. 20, 1998) (transcript available at <http://wv.abcnews.go.com/onair/nightline/transcripts/ntl_981020_trans.html>).
22.
The Millennium Bug Survey: Small Cause, ECONOMIsr, Sept 19, 1998, at 2.
One Y2K commentator and former computer programmer estimated that in the early
days of computer programming, "[a] megabyte of memory was $100,000, compared to
$1.98 today." David Haynes & Finn Bullers, Chances to Fix Problem Squanderedfor
Decades,THE STAR (visited Oct. 15, 1998) <http://www.kcstar.com/item/pages/y2k.
patbusiness/30da66a5.926.htm1> (quoting Ed Yourdon).
Prior to magnetic disk storage, programmers used punch cards which allowed
for only eighty characters per card. See Jim Landers, Lost Chances Litter Year
2000 Bug's Path, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (visited Oct. 5, 1998)
<http://www.dallasnews.com/technology-nf/techbizl.htm>.
One commentator
disagrees with the idea that the two digit calendar year reduced costs. According
to Leon Kappelman, the two digit calendar year saved a software application still
in use after thirty-five years $18,571 to $42,857. For software in use for the past
twenty-five years, the two digit year saved $1,400 to $3,000 per year. Software in
use for the past fifteen years saved $40 to $83 a year due to the two digit
calendar year. See Leon A. Kappelman, Time to Debunk Y2K Myths-To Stand
There Staringat the Oncoming Y2K Lights Reduces No Risks, INFO. WK. (visited Oct.
9, 1998) <http://www.techweb.com/se/direcink.cgi?1WK19980928S0075>.

354

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

iVol. 32:347

even more dramatic.
Thus, during computer programming's
infancy, programmers used the two-digit form for the calendar
year to save memory space.2 3 The two digit year became the
24
industry norm, and the Y2K Bug is the result.
Companies will most likely encounter troubles despite their
diligent attempts to achieve Y2K compliance. 25
Consider, for
example, the Y2K problem and its impact on the delivery of

necessities such as electricity, water, and telephone service. 26
Texas provides a case study with respect to electricity:
23.
Another reason for the Y2K problem is that programmers simply did
not anticipate that their software would be in use when the Year 2000 arrived.
See id.
24.
The history of the two-digit year is an interesting one. As would be
expected, the Pentagon led the pack in the development of computer software.
Eventually, the Department of Defense decided that a "computer grammar"
needed to be developed to unify industry practice. In the 1950s, the Common
Business Oriented Language (COBOL) emerged which allowed for either four or
two-digit calendar years.
In the 1960s, the American Standard Code for
Information Interchange (ASCII) shared the status of being an industry standard
along with COBOL. In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson directed the National
Board of Standards to set the national standard for data processing software. The
resulting standard, which took effect in 1970, was a two-digit calendar year. In
1971, a subcommittee of the American National Standards Institute (a
collaborative effort between industry and the government to arrive at voluntary
standards) published ANSI X3.30-1971 which stated that the four-digit calendar
year was a preferred method to the two-digit year. On the international front, a
similar standard was adopted by the International
Organization of
Standardization. Since the four-digit calendar year was optional, and since the
two-digit year had already become the norm, programmers continued to use the
two-digit format. The first article addressing the Y2K problem was published in
1979 and the second admonition arrived in 1986. See Landers, supranote 22. In
addition, the programming industry has been particularly stubborn about
acknowledging this problem: "[e]ven up until 1997 some computer manufacturers
and some software publishers were sending out products that could be hobbled
by the year 2000 problem." See Haynes & Bullers, supra note 22.
25.
According to the federal definition,
Year 2000 Compliant . . . means that the information technology
accurately processes date/time data (including, but not limited to,
calculating, comparing and sequencing) from, into and between the

twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and the years 1999 and 2000 and
leap year calculations, to the extent that other information technology,
used in combination with the information technology being acquired,
properly exchanges date/time data with it.
Sharon R. Klein & Kara W. Swanson, Getting Ready: Where Might Your Client Find
a Y2KProblem?, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 1998, at 20, 22.
26. [T]he telecommunications network is global. That means carriers in
the rich countries have a business interest in the readiness of their
opposite numbers elsewhere. A survey of carriers in 113 countries by the
American State Department in March found that fewer than half expected
to be millennium-ready on time.
The Millennium Bug Survey: Bare Essentials,ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1998, at 12.
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In January 11998], the Public Utility Commission of Texas surveyed
the state's 176 generation and distribution companies on their Y2K
readiness. Only 44 percent responded. None were yet compliant,
and none had any clear idea when they would be. Among Texas
electric co-ops, only 18 percent had written plans for Y2K
preparations, and 24 percent said they hadn't yet begun planning.
So the PUC, which has absolute regulatory control over these
agencies roared back with a list of recommendations, including
"continuing to monitor Y2K issues" and putting up a Web page
about the problem. About 20 percent of U.S. electric power comes
from nuclear plants. The number of compliant plants so far: 0.
27
Better stock up on candles and batteries, Texans.

Embedded systems, mini-computers which operate machinery,
are also of vital concern. Examples of embedded systems that
may cause mechanical problems

come 2000 are those that

operate security systems, elevators, heating and air conditioning
systems, and, perhaps most startling, medical equipment. 28 One
"Y2K analyst in London predicts that the failure of medical
equipment will lead to approximately fifteen hundred deaths in
29
England alone."
Even if the above systems operate perfectly when the Year
2000 arrives, members of a supply chain must consider whether
their suppliers and customers are prepared for the new year.
Hopefully, the parties comprising the supply chain have begun
dialogue with suppliers and customers in anticipation of 2000.30
However, litigation seems inevitable. 3 1 The following section

27.

Jim Seymour, My Biggest Worry, PC MAG. ONLINE (visited Oct 9, 1998)

<http://www.zdnetcom/pcmag/special/y2k/features/worry/index3.html>. Some people
have taken unconventional steps to prevent falling prey to the Y2K Bug. For example, the
ABC news show, Nightline, featured a family of Y2K Survivalists. The family has invested
in remote desert land and hoarded enough food and weapons to be completely selfsufficient See The Year 2000Bug: Thne to Sound the Alami, or Just a Lot of Hype?, supra
note 21. Another family has, among other things, invested in a water bed which will
provide an additional 300 gallons of water should it become necessary. See Lacayo, supra
note 17, at 60.
28.
See Jordan, supra note 2, at 75. See also Andrew Pollack, Chips Are
Hidden in Washing Machines, Microwaves and Even Reservoirs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4,
1999, at C17 ("As companies and government agencies race to fix the Year 2000
computer problem, they have discovered to their chagrin that problems lurk not
only in computer rooms and personal computers.").
29.
Nations et al., supra note 12, at K-1. The problem is not better among
American health care systems, eighty-seven percent of which are predicted to
experience Y2K problems. See id. (citing Thomas Hoffman, Year 2000: Hospitals
Diagnose Themselves in Crtcal Condition, COMPUTERWORLD <http://www2.computerworld.com/home/printnsf/All/9803022E62>).
30.
Australian companies have begun informal meetings with critical
suppliers in an attempt to discuss Y2K issues and various possible contingency
plans should millennium problems arise. See Margaret Banaghan, Costings Are
Looking Less Than Realistic, INFO. ECON. YEAR 2000 UPDATE (visited Oct. 15, 1998)
<http://www.brw.com.au/content/280998/brw28.htm>.
31.
See Midnight's Children, supra note 12.
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provides a guide to supply failures in America and considers
whether such failures make delivery of goods through the supply
chain commercially impracticable.
III. COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY AND UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 2-615

A. History
The doctrine of Pacta Sunt Servanda (that a contract must be

fulfilled regardless of the circumstances) traditionally controlled
common law.3 2 A breaching party could expect something aldn to
strict liability as a result. However, the legal stomach eventually
soured at the idea of strict liability in every contract case. Thus,
two specific circumstances excused performance of contracts: (1)
death of one of the parties, or (2) a change in the legal scene

making performance of the contract illegal. 33

The doctrine of

32.
The principle which controlled the decision of the cases referred to
rests upon a solid foundation of reason andjustice. It regards the sanctity
of contracts. It requires parties to do what they have agreed to do. If
unexpected impediments lie in the way, and a loss must ensue, it leaves
the loss where the contract places it. If the parties have made no
provision for a dispensation, the rule of law gives none. It does not allow a
contract fairly made to be annulled, and it does not permit to be
interpolated what the parties themselves have not stipulated.
Dermott v. Jones, 69 U.S. 1, 8 (1864). See also Paradine v. Jane, 28 Eng. Rep.
897 (K.B. 1647); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 529 (4th ed.
1998),
33.
In the fourteenth century, the defense of impossibility was used in
cases involving obligations related to issues other than sales. See John D.
Wladis, Impracticability as Risk Allocatiorn The Effect of Changed Circumstances
Upon Contract Obligationsfor the Sale of Goods, 22 GA. L. REv. 503, 506 (1988).
According to Wladis, the first sales case involving impossibility is Hinde v.
Whitehouse, reported in 1806. See id. (citing Hinde v. Whitehouse, 7 East 558,
103 Eng. Rep. 216 (1806)). Commentators have attributed the relatively late
emergence of impossibility in sales cases compared to its application in other
cases to several bases. Williston and Corbin gave two reasons for impossibility's
late emergence: "(1) that the law did not enforce bilateral contracts (a promise for
a promise) until the sixteenth century, and (2) for two centuries after the
recognition of bilateral contracts, the exchanged promises were, in the absence of
express words of condition, held to be mutually independent." Id. at 508.
Conversely, Wladis suggests that the eventual use of impossibility in sales cases
resulted from use of the writ of assumpsit in the sixteenth century. See id. at
512. Before the rise of the writ of assumpsit (which was preceded by an action in

debt), only those informal contracts that were partially performed could be
enforced in the King's courts. See id. at 508. Wladis surmises that most
merchants during this period conducted business via informal contracts to avoid
the cost of forming a sealed instrument. See id. Thus, if impossibility arose
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impossibility, expanding circumstances wherein breach was
excused, later arose to address situations where the harshness of
strict liability was not appealing.3 4 It included "1) destruction,
deterioration or unavailability of the subject matter or the
tangible means of performance; 35 2) failure of the contemplated

mode of delivery or payment; 36 3) supervening prohibition or
prevention by law; 4) failure of the intangible means of
37

performance; and 5) death or illness."
A recent case articulates in classic form the test of this
common law doctrine: "In order to prove impossibility: (1) a
contingency must occur; (2) performance must be impossible, not
just more difficult or more expensive; and (3) the nonoccurrence
of the contingency must be a basic assumption of the
agreement."3 8 The first prong of the test-that something

before any performance on a contract, enforcement of the contract was
impossible. See id. On the other hand, if the buyer had partially performed and
performance was impossible for the seller, the contract would be enforced. See id.
at 509.
Once the writ of assumpsit arose, a buyer could recover more than the value
of the goods. See id. at 511. Thus, "the buyer had incentive to sue, and the seller
had incentive to raise the defense of impossibility of performance." Id. at 512.
However, there still remained a delay from the time the action of assumpsit arose
and a defense of impossibility would lie. See id. Wladis attributes this to use of
the rule of risk which dictated that title to goods passed to the buyer once the
contract was completed. See id. (citing Hinde, supra; Sales of Goods Act, 1893,
56 & 57 Vict. Ch. 71 § 20, reenacted, Sale of Goods Act, 1979, Ch. 54 § 20). As
commercial dealings increased in sophistication, the rule of risk became
outmoded and the defense of impossibility arose. See id.
34.
The doctrine remained based on the notion of implied contractual
terms. See Opera Co. v. Wolf Trap Found. for the Performing Arts, 817 F.2d
1094, 1098 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting the relaxation of the doctrine of impossibility to
encompass situations other than death, illegality, or destruction of the contract's
subject matter to include simply "thing[s] essential to [the contract's]

performance") (quoting Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619, 629-30
(1921)). However, courts and commentators later rejected this notion in favor of a
doctrine that "supplement[s] the defects of the actual contract." Id. (quoting 6
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1331 (2d ed. 1962)).

35.
The U.C.C. has incorporated § 2-613, entitled Casualty to Identified
Goods. This section gives a buyer options if goods identified in a contract are
destroyed either in part or in whole due to the fault of neither the seller nor the
buyer. If the loss of goods is total, then the contract is avoided. However, "[ilf the
loss is partial, the buyer may either avoid or perform under the contract. To the
extent the goods are accepted, the buyer is entitled to an allowance against the
price for the deficiency without further relief against the seller." See Sarah
Howard Jenkins, Exemption for Nonperformance: UCC, CISG, UNIDROIT
Principles-A ComparativeAssessment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2015, 2021-22 (1998).
36.
U.C.C. § 2-614, entitled Substituted Performance, addresses the
problems involved when the intended mode of performance (whether it be mode of
delivery or mode of payment) fails. See U.C.C. § 2-614 (1995).
37.
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supranote 32, at 498.
38.
Kessler v. Tortoise Dev., Inc., 937 P.2d 417, 420 (Idaho 1997) (citing
Haessly v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Idaho 1992)).
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unexpected have occurred-commonly depends on whether the
contingency was foreseeable. If the contingency was foreseeable

at the time of contracting, the parties should have allocated the
risk of that contingency occurring.3 9 Thus, failing to account for
all foreseeable contingencies will typically result in a finding that
the promisor assumed the risk. 4 ° If a party can prove that a

contingency was not foreseeable and the risk of such contingency
occurring was not assumed, the court will determine whether
performance of the contract was made impossible due to the
41
contingency.
In sum, the doctrine of impossibility remains inflexible,
available only to a few defendants. For example, this stringent
standard does not encompass less calamitous situations such as
an increase in the cost of performance. 4 2
The Uniform
Commercial Code's answer to the doctrine of impossibility
incorporates language that seemingly liberalizes the doctrine,
although its actual effect remains debatable. This approach is
discussed below.
B. Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
incorporates a test of commercial impracticability somewhat
similar to that of impossibility articulated above. 43 Section 2-615,
entitled Excuse by Failureof PresupposedConditions, reads:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation
and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a
seller who complies with paragraph (b) and (c) is not a
breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance
as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence
of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic

39.

See Jenins, supra note 35, at 2020 (stating that liberalizing this

doctrine would "frustratea the expectations of the parties in view of the custom
that parties are bound in the absence of stated contingencies").
40.
See id. at 2020.
41.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
42.
While it may be an overstatement to say that increased cost and
difficulty of performance never constitute impracticability, to justify relief
there must be more of a variation between expected cost and the cost of
performing by an available alternative than is present in this case, where
the promisor can legitimately be presumed to have accepted some degree
of abnormal risk, and where impracticability is urged on the basis of
added expense alone.
Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
43.
See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1995); supranote 39 and accompanying text.
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assumption on which the contract was made or by
compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or
domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not
it later proves to be invalid. 44

Courts have whittled this section down to three conditions:
"(1) a contingency must occur, (2) performance must thereby be
made 'impracticable' and (3) the non-occurrence of the
contingency must have been a basic assumption on which the
contract was made. "45
The first and third conditions are
measured by a foreseeability test, thus making the test essentially
two-pronged. 4 6 If the contingency was foreseeable then, as the
language in Section 2-615 notes, it can be presumed that the
seller assumed the risk of the contingency occurring by failing to
account for it in the contract. 47
Whether courts require absolute foreseeability or mere

unexpectedness of the contingency remains ambiguous. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals thoughtfully explained the degree
of foreseeability intended to apply to the modem rule in Opera Co.
v. Wolf Trap Foundationfor the PerformingArts:
As the Court in Mishara Const Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp.
[citation omitted] remarked this question is much broader than
mere foreseeability and is, "Was the contingency which developed
one which the parties could reasonably be thought to have
foreseen as a real possibility which could affect performance?" and
this question is in turn what Judge Learned Hand in CompanhiaDe
Navegacao Lloyd Brasileirov. C. G. Blake Co. [citation omitted] said
was "in the end a question of how unexpected at the time [the
contract was made] was the event which prevented performance."
After all, as Williston has said, practically any occurrence can be
foreseen but whether the foreseeability is sufficient to render
unacceptable the defense of impossibility is "one of degree" of the
foreseeability and whether the non-occurrence of the event was
sufficiently unlikely or unreasonable to constitute a reason for

44.
U.C.C. § 2-615 (1995).
45.
Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293
(7th Cir. 1974).
46.
See Stephen G. York, Re: The Impracticability Doctrineof the U.C.C., 29
DUQ. L. REv. 221, 223, 229-31 (1991) (arguing that the two-prong inquiry
frustrates the drafters' contemplation of the doctrine of impracticability).
47.
Note that U.C.C. § 2-615 only relates to sellers. By virtue of U.C.C.
§ 1-103, the common law doctrine of frustration of the venture should apply in
cases where buyers seek to defend a suit based upon impossibility. These suits
are coined "frustration of purpose." See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 32, at

516 ("The Restatement Second sets forth the same rule for frustration as it does
for impossibility."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1979); Columbian
Natl Title Ins. Co. v. Township Title Servs., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 796, 802-04 (D.
Kan. 1987). The revised U.C.C. will explicitly "reflect an intent by the drafters to
foreclose any use of impracticability by buyers and to limit buyers to the relief
available under the common law doctrine of frustration of purpose under section
1-103." Jenkins, supranote 35, at 2023.
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refusing to apply the doctrine. And that is the rule which we think
accords with modem reasoning of the doctrine as an equitable
48
doctrine and is the one we approve.

TransatlanticFinancing Corp. v. United States4 9 provides an
example of the foreseeability prong of the modern doctrine of
impracticability in action. Transatlantic entered into a charter
agreement with the United States to carry cargo from the United
States to Iran.5 0 The charter did not specify the route to be taken

by Transatlantic.5 1 However, the typical route to Iran entailed
passage through the Suez Canal, and the Egyptian government
closed the canal before Transatlantic could perform.5 2 Instead,

48.

Opera Co. v. Wolf Trap Found. for the Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094,

1101-02 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that some courts do, however, require absolute
foreseeability). This Article adopts the view that foreseeability is not absolute, but
is nonetheless objective and certainly hinges on the expectedness of the
occurrence, in this case, the expectedness of Y2K difficulties.
49.
363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
50.
See id. at 314. When impossibility first emerged, courts allowed the
defense only in few circumstances:
Although impossibility as a defense to an express promise was... flatly
denied, a promise of personal service must have been held excused by
death or unavoidable illness from very early times; and that a supervening
statute making performance clearly illegal would discharge the obligation
of covenant was also early recognized.
18 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1931 (3d ed. 1978) (citing
cases). Furthermore, "[ilt was not until after the middle of the nineteenth century
that it was held that the destruction or non-existence of inanimate subject matter
to which a contract related would excuse a promisor from liability." Id.
Later liberalization of the impossibility doctrine may have resulted from
increased commercial intercourse. See Opera Co., 817 F.2d at 1097. In the
famous English case of Taylor v. Caldwell, the court chose to liberalize the
doctrine based upon a notion that contracts contain fundamental implied
conditions upon which the contract is based. See id. (citing Taylor v. Caldwell, 3
B.&S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 324, 6 R.C. 603 (1863) ("[E]xcuse is by law
implied, because from the nature of the contract it is apparent that the parties
contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the particular person or
chattel.")). Without these implied conditions, the contract could not be fulfilled.
Tventy years later, the United States Supreme Court adopted Taylors rationale in
The Tornado. See id. (quoting The Tornado, 2 S. Ct. 746 (1883)).
Increasingly, though, commentators and text writers were uncomfortable
with the implied condition rationale for the new doctrine of impossibility of
performance . . . . [M]odem authorities also abandoned any absolute
definition of impossibility and, following the example of the Uniform
Commercial Code, have adopted impracticability or commercial
impracticability as synonymous with impossibility in the application of the
doctrine of impossibility of performance as an excuse for breach of
contract.

Opera Co., 817 F.2d at 1098-99.
51.
52.

Transatlantic,363 F.2d at 314.
See id.
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Transatlantic reached Iran via the Cape of Good Hope, increasing
the voyage's costs significantly.5 3 Transatlantic argued that once
the Suez Canal was closed, the contract was impossible to
perform. 5 4 The court found that the closing of the Suez was
foreseeable among those conducting business dependent on that
area.5 5 "We know or may safely assume that the parties were
aware . . . that the Canal might become a dangerous area."5 6 In
other words, the court held that the event was not unexpected
among those with commercial interests in the region. As a result
of "the tension [in the Suez Canal] . . . freight rates [were
affected], and it is arguable that the risk of closure became part of
the dickered terms."5 7
Because the freight rate paid by the
United States presumably accounted for the possible closure of
the Suez Canal, Transatlantic assumed the risk that the canal
would in fact be closed. Had the canal not closed, Transatlantic
would have gained a windfall of sorts, but, as it turned out, the
canal did close and Transatlantic was the party bearing the
resulting loss.

53.
54.
55.

See id. at 319.
See id. at 314-15.
See id. at 318.

56.

Id.

57.
Id. There were several cases resulting from the closing of the Suez
Canal in 1956 and in 1967. See Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, 275 F.2d 253 (2nd
Cir. 1960); The Captain George K. [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 21 (Q.B. 1969). One of
these cases is American Trading and Production Corporationv. Shell International
Marine Limited, 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972). The facts are similar to those of
Transatlantic because of the closure of the Suez Canal, a chartered vessel was
forced to travel along the Cape of Good Hope to satisfy the voyage, thus resulting
in increased costs of $131,978.44. The operator of the vessel argued that the
contract was legally impracticable to perform. Based upon reasoning similar to
that in Transatlantic,the court held that the contract was not impracticable to
fulfill. It focused on the idea that "[m]ere increase in cost alone is not a sufficient
excuse for non-performance." The increased costs represented only one-third of
the contracted price for the voyage. Id. at 992.
In another Suez Canal case, The Eugenia, parties to a charter acknowledged
the possibility that the Canal would be blocked. However, they chose to "leave it
to the lawyers to sort out" if the event occurred. The Eugenia, 1964 1 All E.R.
161, 163 (Q.B. 1964). The vessel indeed was trapped in the Suez Canal due to
Egyptian military action. Once the ship was trapped, the charterers argued that
the contract was frustrated. The court held, first, that the charterers had
breached the contract and that the frustration could not be the result of that
breach. See id. at 165. Second, the court held that the contract was not
frustrated: the contract did not specify that the vessel must sail through the Suez
Canal. Additionally, the vessel eventually reached its destination via the Cape of
Good Hope, a voyage that lasted 138 days as opposed to the 108 days a trip
through the Suez Canal would have taken. See id. at 167. Thus, the blocking of
the Canal did not create "a fundamentally different situation ...
for which the
parties [had] made no provision .... " Id. at 166.
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By comparison, if a seller does not assume the risk,
paragraph (a) of Section 2-615 states that if the contingency that
occurs makes contract performance impracticable, then a seller's
failure to deliver in a timely manner, if at all, is an excused
breach. This test looks remarkably similar to that of the doctrine
of impossibility except for the use of the term "impracticable"
58
instead of "impossible."
The difference in the two terms leads one through a semantic
nightmare. Under the common law doctrine of impossibility,
impossibility means impossibility. Performance cannot be merely
difficult or even unreasonable; nothing short of impossibility of
performance will excuse a breach of contract.5 9 The U.C.C. does
not define impracticability, 60 but the Restatement (Second) of

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAcTs § 261 cmt. d (1979). Before the
58.
U.C.C., caselaw continued to look to impossibility rather than impracticability.
Wladis summarizes pre-Code caselaw:
[It] displayed an apparent consensus that sellers should be excused for
nonperformance caused by supervening events only in limited
circumstances, primarily: (1) where an excuse clause covered the event;
(2) where the seller's performance had been prevented by government
action; or (3) where the goods were to come from some source or by some
means either specified in the contract or contemplated by the parties.
Wladis, supra note 33, at 529. He then concludes that "[these pre-Code courts]
seem to have engaged in an incipient process of risk allocation." Id.
See Transatlantic,259 F. Supp. at 728 (if the supervening event only
59.
renders attainment of the ultimate objective more oppressive or more expensive,
the contractor has [a] duty to go forward without extra compensation"); Marshick
v. Marshick, 545 P.2d 436, 439 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) ("contractual duties [must)
be impossible for anyone to perform." (emphasis in original)); Hudson v. D & V
Mason Contractors, Inc., 252 A.2d 166, 169 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) ("'A contract is
not invalid ... because it turns out to be difficult or burdensome to perform."')
(quoting Safe Harbor Fishing Club v. Safe Harbor Reality Co., 107 A.2d 635
(1953); White Lakes Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 490
P.2d 609, 612 (Kan. 1971) ("The impossibility which will, or may, excuse the
performance of a contract must exist in the nature of the thing to be done. It
must not exist merely because of the inability or incapacity of the promisor ...to
do it."); Roundup Cattle Feeders v. Fred Horpestad, 603 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Mont.
1979). But see Capitol Vial, Inc. v. International Bioproducts, Inc., 980 F. Supp.
628, 632 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) ("extreme and unreasonable hardship" suffices to prove
impossibility); Stock & Grove, Inc. v. United States, 493 F.2d 629, 643 (Ct. Cl.
1974) (not requiring literal or physical impossibility but instead noting that
"difficulty, cost, and time factors can make performance practically or
commercially impossible.").
60.
Comment 4 of § 2-615 describes instances of commercial
impracticability:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost
is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of
the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a
justification .... But a sever shortage of raw materials or of supplies due
to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen
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Contracts instructs that "impracticability means more than
impracticality." 6 ' As a result, courts at times have considered
impracticability as a different animal than impossibility. For
example, some courts hold that impossibility encompasses both
strict impossibility and practical impossibility.6 2 The court in

shutdown of major sources of supply or the like,

.

.

. is within the

contemplation of this section.
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (1995).
61.
Section 261 of the Restatement reads:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 261 (1979). Comment d reads:

Events that come within the rule stated in this Section are generally due
either to 'acts of God' or to acts of third parties. If the event that prevents
the obligor's performance is caused by the obligee, it will ordinarily
amount to a breach by the latter and the situation will be governed by the
rules stated in Chapter 10, without regard to this Section .....
If the
event is due to the fault of the obligor himself, this Section does not apply.
As used here Tault' may include not only 'willful' wrongs, but such other
types of conduct as that amounting to breach of contract or to
negligence ....
Although the rule stated in this Section is sometimes
phrased in terms of impossibility,' it has long been recognized that it may
operate to discharge a party's duty even though the event has not made
performance absolutely impossible.
This Section, therefore, uses
'impracticable,' the term employed by Uniform Commercial Code section
2-615(a), to describe the required extent of the impediment to
performance. Performance may be impracticable because extreme and
unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of the parties will
be involved. A severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to war,
embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of
supply, or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or
prevents performance altogether may bring the case within the rule stated
in this Section. Performance may also be impracticable because it will
involve a risk of injury to person or to property, of one of the parties or of
others, that is disproportionate to the ends to be attained by performance.
However, 'impracticability' means more than 'impracticality.'
A mere
change in the degree of difficulty or expense due to such causes as
increased wages, prices of raw materials, or costs of construction, unless
well beyond the normal range, does not amount to impracticability since it
is this sort of risk that a fixed-price contract is intended to cover.
Furthermore, a party is expected to use reasonable efforts to surmount
obstacles to performance [citation omitted], and a performance is
impracticable only if it is so in spite of such efforts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1979).
62.
See F.J. Busse, Inc. v. Department of Gen. Servs., 408 A.2d 578, 581
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) ("Legal impossibility means not only strict impossibility,
but impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense,

injury or loss involved."); Portland Section of the Council of Jewish Women v.

364

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

Vol. 32:347

Opera Co., for example, simply asked whether the non-occurrence
of the contingency-in that case, no electricity-was an
assumption upon which the contract was based. 63 Because it
was, impossibility, or at least impracticability was met.64
Conversely, one commentator argues that courts generally force
impracticability into impossibility, thus creating an unnecessarily
high bar for defendants claiming the defense. 6s
Perhaps the answer to this ambiguity rests with the idea of
objective versus subjective impracticability. One court noted: "A
distinction [should be] drawn between impracticability which is
'subjective' and 'objective.'
This has been described as the
difference, respectively, between 'I cannot do it' and 'the thing
cannot be done.' Only objective impracticability may serve to
relieve a party of his or her contractual obligation." 6 6 By making
commercial impracticability purely objective, the defense begins to
look more like impossibility than impracticability.
In Tallackson Potato Co. v. MTK Potato Co., the court adopted
a broad view of objectivity. 67 The court argued that impossibility
embraces the idea of impracticability, but that the "[defendant]

must show that it cannot perform and that performance could not
be completed by anyone." 68 Such a standard-requiring that no
one could perform the contract-seems

to lean towards the

Sisters of Charity, 513 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Or. 1973) ("The law on the subject of
impossibility or hardship is unclear since much of the area is a matter of
discretion in enforcing a given contract. However, the modem trend appears to
be to allow the defense in more cases than formerly... ." (citation omitted)).
63.
See Opera Co., 817 F.2d at 1102.
64.
See icl
65.
Forcing impracticability into impossibility runs counter to the intent of
the U.C.C.'s drafters:
[T]he comments [of the U.C.C.] indicate that Llewellyn intended the Code
impracticability defense to be available in more situations than the
common law impossibility doctrine would allow. Unfortunately, '[i]n spite
of the intent of the draftsmen of section 2-615 to achieve innovation and
liberalization of the law, the judiciary.. . [has] shut the door to further
judicial interpretation and expansion.'
This means that courts have
treated 'Code impracticability [to be] very much like the common law
doctrine of impossibility.'
Consequently, the courts' interpretation of
section 2-615(a) has not been true to the drafters' intent.
See York, supranote 46, at 238 (quoting Paula Walter, CommercialImpracticability
in Contracts, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225, 259 (1987)).
66.
Sunflower Elec. Coop. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 638 P.2d 963, 970 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1981).
67.
Tallackson Potato Co., Inc. v. MTK Potato Co., 278 N.W.2d 417, 424 &
n.6 (N.D. 1979).
68.
Id. at 424. One commentator argues that equating impracticability
with impossibility runs contrary to the intent of the U.C.C. drafters. See York,

supranote 46, at 237-38.
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impossibility side of the continuum as opposed to the more liberal

standard of impracticability.
On the other side of the spectrum, in Opera Co. the electricity
failed and an opera had to be cancelled. 69 The court found that
functioning electricity was a basis of the contract, and as a result,
the contract could not be performed. 70 If the standard had been
that of Tallackson-that the performance had to be impossible for
anyone to perform-the outcome may have been different because
it seems plausible that some theatrical troupe could have indeed
operated without electricity. Thus, the outcome of an
impracticability defense will be greatly influenced by how broadly
the court interprets the objective impracticability element of the
Section 2-615 test.
C. Application to Y2K
Y2K problems seem inevitable; such problems have already
arisen. 7 1 Therefore, members of a supply chain should give great
weight to the idea that, at the very least, disruptions in that
supply chain will occur. At the worst, the supply chain will break
down completely. Because contracts and their resulting
obligations form the mortar of a supply chain, any party left in
the "cold" as a result of a "breal in the supply chain will
probably look to litigation for recoupment. Due to the strict
liability nature of contract law and the interdependency of supply
chains, very few "outs" exist for breaching parties, regardless of
their own Y2K readiness.
Consider the following elementary hypothetical using
domestic law. Because of a disruption in an international supply
chain due to Y2K problems, an American buyer brings suit based
on breach of contract against an American seller for failing to

69.

Opera Co. v. Wolf Trap Found. of Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094,

1096 (1987).
70.
See id. at 1103.
71.
See supra note 2. Other problems have arisen as well. For example,
thirty-one percent of Australia's largest one thousand companies complain of
trouble with software due to the Millennium Bug.
See Stuart Kennedy,
Millennium Bug Already Loose, COMPUTER DAILY NEWs, Feb. 17, 1998, at 1998 WL
5029841. Additionally, some Australian prisoners were released prematurely due
to Y2K glitches. See Stuart Kennedy, Year 2000 Bug is Already Biting, COMPUTER
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 5, 1997, at 1997 WIL 13910336. In Sweden and Singapore, taxi
meters have malfunctioned. See Nation/World Briefs, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 4,
1999, at 21. In the United States, movie-goers found that AMC theater registers
could not process credit card purchases by credit cards expiring in 2000 or
beyond.
See Year 2000 Bug Already Bit Some Businesses, ST. Louis POST
DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 1998, at C7.
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deliver the contracted goods. 7 2 The contract breached makes no
mention of Y2K, and thus neither party explicitly assumed the
risk of Y2K supply chain disturbances. In such an event,
American contract law will govern, and the defendant may
consider using U.C.C. Section 2-615 as a defense to the breach.
Courts will use the two pronged method described above to
determine whether such a defense is viable. 73 Before embarking
on such an inquiry, however, our hypothetical must divide supply
chain defendants into two intuitive groups: those defendants that
commit breach because of their failure to address Y2K, and those
Y2K-compliant defendants that breach due to "upstream" Y2K
problems. In the former case, it seems apparent that the
defendant is foreclosed from claiming commercial impracticability.

In the latter case, the same seems true save for rare exceptions.
1. Non Y2K-Compliant Defendant
The case against a non-compliant supplier that breaches
because of its failure to address Y2K seems simple, thus negating
the necessity for a lengthy commentary. This simplicity comes
from two notions. First, courts conduct the two-pronged test in a
fairly methodical order.74 They first consider whether the
unexpected contingency that caused the breach was foreseeable.
If the foreseeability prong is not met, then the court will not have
to consider the commercial impracticability of fulfilling the
contract, no matter the situation. Given that Y2K and its potential
problems are well-recognized in the United States, it is unlikely
that a contracting party could successfully argue that Y2K
problems were unforeseeable. Television and radio shows,
magazines, newspapers, industry publications, and myriad
Internet sites have focused on the ramifications of the Millennium
Bug. 75 Because the Y2K Bug has generated so much attention, it
seems inevitable that any problems associated with it are
foreseeable. Thus, a non-compliant defendant will most likely fail
the foreseeability prong of the Section 2-615 test.
Nonetheless, the question of timing arises. Courts measure
the timing of foreseeability at the time into which the contract
was entered. 7 6 Thus, when the contract at issue is (very) longterm, perhaps an argument that the Y2K computer glitch was not

72.

See also supranote 35.

See York, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See iL
See supranotes 2-15 and accompanying text.
76.
See Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Canada) Ltd., 802 F.2d
1362, 1366 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map Constr. Corp., 368
73.
74.
75.

A.2d 1088, 1093-94 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
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foreseeable-or extremely unexpected-at the signing of the
contract would be plausible.7 7
Practically spealdng, however,
sympathy may not be forthcoming from judge or jury when a

defendant opts for a "wait and see approach'

instead of

incorporating Y2K into its long term contracts as soon as the
problem is apparent.

What most effectively bars a non-compliant defendant's use
of excuse derives from caselaw and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. A defendant claiming excuse due to impracticability
must have done all that is reasonable to have prevented the
impossibility from occurring. 78 Thus, this rule forecloses use of
the defense by the non-compliant defendant if the non-compliant
79
defendant failed to address Y2K computer glitches.
2. Y2K-Compliant Defendant
In our hypothetical, the compliant defendant breached the
contract between itself and the plaintiff buyer because of Y2K

77.
The common law doctrine of supervening impossibility should also be
noted here. Some courts have held that impossibility that arises after formation
of the contract will not excuse a defendant. See Metropolitan Dade County v.
Babcock Co., 287 So.2d 139, 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Damazo v. Neal, 363
A.2d 252, 256 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976). However, the U.C.C. says nothing
about supervening impracticality, thus this doctrine may be irrelevant to our
discussion. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1995).
In any event, the first warnings of potential Y2K problems came in the late
1970s and early 1980s. See supra note 22.
78.
"A party is expected to use reasonable efforts to surmount obstacles to
performance, and a performance is impracticable only if it is so in spite of such

efforts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 cmt. d (1979).
79.
Presumably, the non-compliant defendant could have attempted to
remedy Y2K problems yet failed. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts presents
several cases that discuss the type of effort required to satisfy the Restatement's

test of "reasonable efforts to surmount obstacles to performance." See Stock &
Grove, Inc. v. United States, 493 F.2d 629 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (performance beyond
state of the art); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. United States, 513 F.2d 588 (Ct. Cl.
1975). This Article assumes that the non-compliant defendant simply dismissed

the importance of Y2K readiness.

An additional wrinkle should be mentioned. One commentator has noted a
trend among American cases that is particularly relevant in the face of potential
Y2K problems:
I suggest that it is not accident ... that the courts are more willing to find
an excuse where the supervening event has drastic consequences only for
one contract or a small number of contracts than where the supervening
event affects an enormous number of transactions.
Joseph M. Perillo, Force Majeure and Hardship Under the UNIDROIT Principlesof
Internati6nalCommercial Contracts, 5 TUL. J. INTL & COMP. L. 5, 18 (Spring 1997).
If such a trend does indeed exist, parties who fail to perform due to Y2K
problems may find that excuse simply is not available to them unless those
problems are not widespread.
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failures of its upstream suppliers. Putting aside indemnification
issues,8 0 the compliant defendant may very well argue that
performance of the contract was made commercially impracticable
due to the upstream Y2K failures. Many reported cases address
commercial impracticability due to upstream supplier failure and
state that the determinative issue is whether the contract

specified the source from which the supplier-promisor was to
receive its goods. 8 1
This result stems from the two-prong test discussed above.

The circumstance at issue is whether the failure of an upstream
supplier to deliver its goods to the promisor was foreseeable or an
unexpected event. Courts generally hold that such a failure is
foreseeable. 8 2 Because the event is foreseeable and not explicitly

To succeed in a defense based on § 2-615, the defendant supplier in a
80.
supply chain must '[turn] over to the buyer... his rights against the defaulting
source of supply to the extent of the buyer's contract in relation to which excuse
is being claimed." U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 5 (1995).
81.
See generally Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc.,
600 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1979); Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Volk Constr., Inc., 500 F.
Supp. 82 (D.C. Mont. 1980); Center Garment Co., Inc. v. United Refrigerator Co.,
341 N.E.2d 669 (Mass. 1976); Barbarossa & Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265
N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1978); Lambert v. Columbus, 496 N.W.2d 540 (Neb. 1993);
Zamoiski Co. v. Tenavision, Inc., 1986 WL 10274 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Frank B. Bozzo,
Inc. v. Electric Weld Div. of Ft. Pitt Bridge Div., 423 A.2d 702 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980).
82.
See Barbarossa,265 N.W.2d 655; Zamoiski4 1986 WL 10274; Alamance
County Bd. of Educ. v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1996); Magnetic Copy Servs., Inc. v. Seismic Specialists, Inc., 805 P.2d 1161
(Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
Note that such findings fail to comport with the idea proffered by the court in
Opera Co. The court stated that foreseeability should only be one factor in what is
essentially a case by case analysis of the parties' respective positions at the
formation of the contract. According to the opinion, a court should first resolve:
how likely the occurrence of the event in question was and, second
whether its occurrence, based on past experience, was of such reasonable
likelihood that the obligor should not merely foresee the risk but, because
of the degree of its likelihood, the obligor should have guarded against it or
provided for non-liability against the risk.
Opera Co. v. Wolf Trap Found. for the Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1103 (4th
Cir. 1987).
Courts find that failure of an upstream supplier is foreseeable unless that
supplier is named in the contract. However, under the court's analysis above,
courts would have to consider each contract individually to consider whether
there was a risk, the potential of which was strong enough for the parties to
assign liability in the contract. For example, a compliant defendant could rely on
a supplier that has never failed to deliver but unfortunately fails to do so because
of Y2K computer glitches. If such is the case, under the court's reasoning above,
there would have been no reason for the compliant defendant to name that
supplier in the contract since failure by that supplier was unexpected. As a
result, the upstream supplier's failure would be held unforeseeable. However,
courts typically forego such analysis and adhere to the general rule that the
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taken into account in the breached contract, the defense will
necessarily fail. Courts will presume that such a risk was
accounted for in the purchase price and that as a result the
83
promisor thereby assumed the risk.
If, however, the upstream supplier is identified as the sole
source from which the goods are to be received by the promisor,
courts find that the promisee-buyer, as opposed to the promisorsupplier, assumed the risk of a supply failure. Additionally, the
comments to Section 2-615 advise that when a contract specifies
a source of the promisor's goods, that specific source becomes a
basic assumption of the contract: "In the case of failure of
production by an agreed source for causes beyond the seller's
control, the seller should, if possible, be excused since production
by an agreed source is without more a basic assumption of the
84
contract."
An example of this logic is found in Selland Pontiac-GMC,Inc.
v. King.8 5 In this case, King performed as both a buyer and a
seller in a miniature supply chain.8 6 King was to buy school bus

bodies manufactured by Superior Manufacturing and then build
the bodies onto chassis provided by the buyer, Selland.8 7 Selland
would then buy the completed bodies from King.8 8 The contract
between Selland and King specified that the bus bodies were to
Superior subsequently
come from Superior Manufacturing. 9
a
result,
King breached the
went out of business and as
90
King
relied
on commercial
sued
King
and
contract.
Selland
91
impracticability.
The court first outlined the general rule with which most
courts concur: "A partial failure of a seller's source of supply
generally has been treated as a foreseeable contingency, the risk
of which is allocated to the seller absent a specific provision to the
contrary in the contract."9 2 However, in the event that the
upstream supplier is specified in a contract, the failure of the
upstream supplier is grounds for a defense of commercial

failure of an upstream supplier is foreseeable. See infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
See infranote 46 and accompanying text.
83.
U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 5 (1995).
84.
85.
See Selland Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. King, 384 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. Ct.

App. 1986).
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Seeid- at 491.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 492.
See id. at 491-92.
See id.
See id at 493 (quoting Barbarossa & Sons, 265 N.W.2d at 659-60).
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impracticability. 9 3 Thus, the court found that King's performance
94
was excused.
Applying this notion to our compliant defendant, if the supply
source is specified in the compliant defendant's contract with the
plaintiff-buyer, then the defense of commercial impracticability
may succeed. However, this defense is subject to yet another
barrier, which is illustrated in Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval
International,Ltd., a case analogous to our international supply
chain hypothetical. 9 r

93.
Here the seller's supplier was specified in the contract. Superior
In [a
was also specified in King's price quotation to Selland.
distinguishable case] the supplier did not cease to manufacture, but
simply cancelled the orders of some of its dealers. Here both parties
testified that they had no knowledge of Superior's questionable financial
circumstances when they contracted and King did not expressly assume
the risk of Superior's ceasing production.

Id.
94.
See id.; see also Olson v. Spitzer, 257 N.W.2d 459 (S.D. 1977) (seller
excused from performance when, after contracting to sell to plaintiffs a John
Deere tractor combine with a four row cornhead implement, seller was unable to
obtain implement from manufacturer).
95.
Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Intl, Ltd., 719 F.2d 1465, 1467-68
(9th Cir. 1983). ZideU involved not only a breach of contract claim, but claims
under anti-trust laws. In the opinion's Statement of Facts, the court more fully
explains the intercourse between the parties:
Appellants Conval Corporation ('Conval) and The Lunkenheimer
Company (TLC) [footnote omitted] are brother-sister corporations, both
wholly owned subsidiaries of Condec Corporation. Appellant Conval
International, Limited ('CILI is a wholly owned subsidiary of Conval. All
are involved in the sale of cast steel industrial valves under the
Lunkenheimer brand name. CIL handled the sale of foreign-made valves,
while TLC handled the sale of domestic valves within the United States.
Appellee Zidell is the nation's largest distributor of foreign-made
industrial valves. In March 1978, CIL and Zidell discussed a proposal to
make Zidell the exclusive distributor of foreign-made Lunkenheimer
valves. The valves were manufactured under license by Energoinvest, a
Yugoslavian company, and imported into the United States by CIL. Under
the proposed exclusive distributorship agreement, Zidell agreed to buy a
minimum of $5 million per annum of valves from CIL. Prices were to be
negotiated concurrently with and in relationship to price changes made by
Energoinvest. There was some evidence that CIL attempted to avoid
disclosing the existence of the agreement to TLC, the manufacturer of
domestically produced Lunkenheimer valves. The imported valves were
priced about 40% lower than their domestic counterparts, and CIL
apparently feared that TLC would view the Zidell agreement as a threat to
its sales of domestic Lunkenheimer valves. CIL sold several orders of
valves to Zidell at what CIL calls "distress" prices. It now contends that
those prices were not intended to be the regular prices under the
agreement, but were merely intended to clear a large backlog of inventory.
Through July 1978, CIL actively aided Zidell in its efforts to market the
foreign-made valves.
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The Zidell case involves an international supply chain. Conval
International domestically sold Yugoslavian valves manufactured
by Energoinvest. 96 Conval International and Zidell entered into a
contract in which Zidell would distribute the Yugoslavian valves
in the United States.9 7 Due to a pricing dispute, Conval
International refused to deliver the valves. 98 Zidell attempted to
deal with Energoinvest directly to no avail. 9 9 Zidell sued Conval
International for breach of contract and Conval argued that
"Energoinvest refused to manufacture [the valves contracted for],

In July 1978, after complaints from TLC's distributors, officers of TLC
began to protest the Zidell agreement, citing the damaging effect of
marketing foreign-made valves on domestic valve sales. Following these
protests, CIL wrote to Zidell claiming that Zidell had never returned a
signed copy of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Zidell presented
CIL a copy of the signed agreement and a forwarding cover letter dated
June 12, 1978, and CIL agreed to honor the contract.
However, a series of disputes soon ensued. CIL refused to honor several
orders placed by Zidell, claiming that Zidell was attempting to place those
orders at 'distress' prices that were no longer in effect. CIL presented
Zidell with a new price list, but Zidell insisted that the old prices were to
govern until CIL actually faced price increases from Energoinvest. After
rejecting several large orders placed by Zidell, CIL charged that Zidell was
not ordering at the minimum $5 million level stipulated in the contract
and attempted to terminate the contract
Zidell tried to obtain
foreign-made Lunkenheimer valves directly from Energoinvest, but found
that CIL had demanded that Energoinvest make no such sales. When
Energoinvest refused to produce certain large valves ordered by Zidell
through CIL, CIL did not seek to compel Energoinvest to perform or
attempt to deliver substitute goods; it simply refused to honor the
contract with Zidell. Zidell began to withhold payment to CIL in an effort
to force CIL to honor its orders.
In December 1978, CIL notified Zidell that it would be terminated as
exclusive distributor effective January 31, 1979. Upon CIL's termination
of Zidell, CIL and TLC worked jointly to establish a distribution network
for foreign-made Lunkenheimer valves. The foreign-made valves were
distributed through basically the same channels as were the domestic
valves. Still anxious to purchase Lunkenheimer valves, but unwilling to
pay what it considered to be 'extraordinarily high' prices quoted by CIL,
Zidell attempted to purchase the valves through European traders. Zidell
found the European traders unwilling to deal because of restrictions in
their contracts with Energoinvest.
Zidell then brought the present action in the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon, charging CIL with breach of contract and all

defendants with conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws.
Id.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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and that this refusal rendered [Conval International's]
performance under the contract impossible.. ...00
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's holding that
the contract at issue was a contract involving an agreed
source.1 0 1 After so finding, the court turned to comment 5 to
U.C.C. Section 2-615, which insists that defendants claiming
commercial impracticability satisfy two prerequisite conditions.
First, the seller-defendant must have done all in its power to
"assure that the agreed supplier would perform." 1°2 Second, the
seller-defendant must have relinquished any rights it had in a
breach of contract action against the agreed source to the buyerplaintiff.1 0 3 In the first instance, the court held that it was
conceivable that Conval International had exercised "all due
measures" to assure that Energoinvest would produce the
valves.1 0 4 Thus, the court held that this issue should have been
sent to the jury.10 5 In the second instance, the court noted that
Conval International had yet to tender its rights against
Energoinvest to Zidell, but the court "decline[d] to hold ... that a

failure to tender rights against the supplier constitutes a per se
violation of the obligation of good faith" that would defeat the
defendant-seller's defense of commercial impracticability.' 0 6 Thus,
Conval International's claim of commercial impracticability of
performance should also have gone to the jury. 107
Zidell's focus on official comment 5 to U.C.C. Section 2-615
underscores the importance that a seller "employ[] all due
measures to assure himself that his source will not fail." This
100.
101.

otherwise,

Zidel, 719 F.2d at 1472.
See id. Courts insist that the contract have an agreed source,
it is the defendant-seller's burden to "'employ any practicable

alternative means of fulfilling the contract.. . ." Luria Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Pielet
Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d at 112 (quoting Chemetron Corp. v.
McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 257 (N.D. in., E.D. 1974)).

[Tihe district court explicitly construed the contract to mean that 'Zidell
was to be the exclusive distributor in the United States of Lunkenheimer
International valves. In other words, of the Lunkenheimer International
valves that were manufactured by Energoinvest in Yugoslavia.' We see no
error in this construction... it is difficult to imagine a contract with such
a provision in which there was no agreed source.
Zidell, 719 F.2d at 1472.
102.
Id.
103,
See Zidell, 719 F.2d at 1472; see also U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 5 (1995).
104.
See Zidell, 719 F.2d at 1472.
105.
See id.
106.
See Zide, 719 F.2d at 1473. The court pragmatically noted that "tilt is
not hard to imagine situations in which a seller could reasonably and in good
faith conclude that immediately delivering a lawsuit into the hands of the buyer
would be counterproductive for all the parties concerned." I.

107.

See id,
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comment presents a timing issue particularly relevant to the Y2K
problem. The Zidell court focused only on what Conval
International had done after Energoinvest refused to manufacture
the valves.
However, considering that a seller must "assure

himself that his source will not fail,"10 8 perhaps the court should
have considered-required Conval International to produceevidence pertaining to what Conval International had done at the
time of contracting and over the life of the contract to ensure
performance.
For example, consider the Ziddell case in a Y2K context.
Suppose Energoinvest failed to make the valves because of a
catastrophic shut-down due to Y2K failures and that Conval
International had reason to know that Energoinvest was not Y2Kcompliant. Should Conval International have taken a course of
action insisting that Energoinvest be Y2K-compliant? If so, would
failure to do so foreclose Conval's defense of commercial
impracticability? Considering the plain language of comment 5, it
appears that some foresight on the part of a supplier is necessary
to try to prevent failures in the upstream supply chain. Thus, it
would seem reasonable to address these concerns in supply chain
contracts. 109
One particularly relevant article has presented language
which, when inserted in a contract, could perform the function of
assuring suppliers that their sources will not fail:
Each party covenants and agrees that it will not permit a Year
2000 problem in computer systems, software or equipment owned,

leased or licensed by it, its affiliates or subsidiaries to interfere with
its performance under this agreement. Each party further agrees
to request, from those of its suppliers whose performance may
materially affect that party's performance hereunder, that each
such supplier undertake the same obligation with respect to such
material performance. The parties will use reasonable commercial
efforts to cooperate and share information to further comply with
this article, and to minimize the impact of any Year 2000 problem
on performance of this agreement. Each party will inform the other

party of any circumstance indicating a possible obstacle to such
compliance, and the steps being taken to avoid or overcome the
obstacle.

1 10

108.
Id. (emphasis added).
109.
See Donald A. Cohn & Paul S. Wittman, How Y2K Could Affect the
Supply Chain: A Problemfor Day-to-Day Contracts, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 1998,
at 37.
110.
Id. at 39. The authors additionally define a "Year 2000 Problem" and
insert a clause which would essentially place the risk of subcontractors' Y2K

failures on the opposite party. For example, the buyer would assume the risk
that the seller's upstream suppliers might fail due to Y2K and vice versa. In this
manner, the authors argue, the risks are satisfactorily distributed throughout the
supply chain without becoming a "hot potato." Because this Article is considering
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By inserting comparable language into supply contracts, a
potential defendant-seller could use the contract itself to show
that it had "employed all due measures to assure himself that his
source will not fail."1 1
3. Conclusion
This section has analyzed law involving U.C.C. Section 2-615
and the doctrine of commercial impracticability. Courts, when
faced with a defense of commercial impracticability, will consider
first whether the occurrence creating the commercial
impracticability was foreseeable. If so, then the defense must fail
unless they plaintiff-buyer explicitly assumed the risk. Second, if
the occurrence was unforeseeable, the court will decide whether
the occurrence made performance commercially impracticable.

only those circumstances when a contract involves an agreed source, their
proposed language would serve as evidence that a defendant-seller had in fact
done all it could to assure itself that its supplier would not fail due to Y2K
problems. However, if a contract does not involve an agreed source, the proposed
language and further risk-shifting devices could prove helpful. See icL
111. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 5 (1995). Additionally, some courts have held that
when a supplier's failure to deliver is known by the defendant-seller and that
defendant-seller did nothing to assure adequate performance, the defense of
commercial impracticability is not available. See Deardorff-Jackson Co. v.
National Produce Distribs., Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 1164 (Dept Agric.
1967). Thus, the language proposed above may satisfy the § 2-615 comment 5
requirement that the defendant-seller "[employ] all due measures to assure
himself that his source will not fail," but additional steps involving assurance of
adequate performance should also be undertaken when supply problems become
apparent. For example, U.C.C. § 2-609 grants contracting parties the right to
demand adequate assurance of performance.
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the
other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired.
When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the
performance of either party the other may in writing demand adequate

assurance of due performance and until he receives such assurance may
if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which he has not
already received the agreed return.
(4) After receipt of a justified demand failure to provide within a
reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due
performance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular
case is a repudiation of the contract.

U.C.C. § 2-609 (1995).
Considering the nature of some contracts, reversion to a remedy such as
U.C.C. § 2-609 may be extreme. Especially in light of the Y2K Bug, any
assurance of performance is questionable. Even with extensive testing, most are
unsure as to what will arrive come January 1, 2000. Thus, more diplomatic
methods of ensuring Y2K compliance (or at least an attempt thereof) are in order.
For an example of an amenable way to allocate risks in a supply chain, see
generally Cohn & Williams, supranote 109.

1999]

INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND THE Y2K PROBLEM

375

This section also presented two hypothetical defendantsellers that were faced with Y2K problems. In the first case, the
defendant-seller breached a contract due to internal problems
with Y2K. In this instance, the defendant-seller will almost
undoubtedly be held liable because it failed to do all that was
reasonable to prevent the breach.
In the second hypothetical, the defendant-seller was Y2Kcompliant but suffered problems because of 'upstream" Y2K
failures caused by the non-compliance of its sellers.
This
defendant-seller fared similarly to the first defendant save the one
exception of a contract involving an agreed source. In such a
case, the defense of commercial impracticability may succeed, but
only if: (1) the defendant-seller did all it could to assure that its
suppliers would not fail because of Y2K problems, and (2) it
tendered its rights against its failing supplier to the plaintiffbuyer.
In the event that a contract with an agreed source is not
practical, it seems prudent to review existing contracts to try to
sensibly allocate Y2K risks among buyers and sellers in a supply
chain. By doing so, hopefully, burdensome litigation and
impossible demands will be averted, and Y2K litigation costs will
11 2
be kept to a minimum.
The next section deals with an international supply chain in
which one party is not domestic. In this case, courts will apply
international legal principles. However, as will be seen, the
outcomes of these cases may be quite similar to outcomes under
U.C.C. Section 2-615.
IV. INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT

A. The United Nations Convention on the
InternationalSale of Goods

The United Nations Convention on the International Sale of
Goods (CISG)1 13 is a convention that was formed by the United
14
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),1

112. See Cohn & Williams, supra note 109, at 37.
113. For the history of the CISG, see B. Blair Crawford et al., New Rules for
Contracting in the Global Marketplace: The United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the InternationalSale of Goods, C396 AL -ABA 115, 117 (Mar. 9, 1989).
114. See Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principlesof InternationalCommercial
Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 282
(1994). UNCITRAL is composed of "an international group of lawyers and
scholars...." Id.
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and signed by participating countries in 1980.11s The U.S.
Senate ratified the Convention in 1986, and the CISG became
United States law on January 1, 1988.116 The CISG applies to
any sale of goods between parties "whose places of business are in
different States [countries] and either both of those States are
private international law lead to
Contracting States or the rules 1of
17
the law of a Contracting State."
The analog to U.C.C. Section 2-615 is Article 79. It states in

part that:
(1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his
obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impediment
beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to
have taken the impediment into account at the time of the
conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its
consequences.
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom
he has engaged to perform the whole or a part of the contact, that
party is exempt from liability only if(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and
the person whom he has so engaged would be so exempt if the
provisions of that paragraph were applied to him.' 1

Article 79 differs from the U.C.C. in a few key aspects. First,
Article 79, unlike U.C.C. Section 2-615, applies to either party to
the contract. 1 19 The language of Section 2-615 indicates that its
defense only applies to sellers. 2 0° Second, the instances in which
a party may claim the defense differ. The U.C.C. allows the
defense only upon "delay in delivery [and] non-delivery," 1 1 while
the Convention applies to any aspect of contractual

115. See Crawford et al., supra note 113, at 117. The present signatories to
the Convention are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, BosniaHerzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania,
Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, and
Zambia. See CISG: List of Contracting States (last modified Sept. 16, 1998)
<http://joe.law.pace.edu/dirnotab.html>.
116. See Crawford et al., supranote 113, at 119; see also supra note 15.
117. Henry D. Gabriel, A Primer on the United Nations Convention on the
InternationalSale of Goods: From the Perspective of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 279 (1997). There are additional restrictions to the
applicability of the CISG. See generallyid
118. CISG art. 79.
119. See id.
120. See supranote 47.
121. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1995).
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performance. 122 Third, the types of unexpected contingencies at
issue in Article 79 are those "impedimrent[s] beyond [the party's]
control," 123 as opposed to those contingencies "the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made" that are covered by Section 2-615.124
Practically speaking this difference between Section 2-615 and
Article 79 may or may not affect the outcome of cases for two
reasons. First, as noted below, Article 79 applies only when
performance is impossible, as opposed to impossible and/or
impracticable.1 2 5 The U.C.C. adopts a measure of commercial
impracticability, but whether courts actually set a defendant's
burden at the standard depends on how broadly the court is
For example, if a court
willing to interpret impracticability.
defines impracticability as a situation where absolutely no one
could be able to perform the contract, the defense will be much
more difficult for a defendant to sustain. However, if the court,
like the one in Opera Co., asks only whether the non-occurrence
of the contingency was a basic assumption of26the contract,
defendants will be more successful in the defense. 1
On the other hand, even the most meticulous semantic
analysis cannot predict how courts will react when presented with
CISG. Todd Weitzmann, in analyzing an Italian case that
addressed Article 79, noted the difficulty courts have when relying
solely on the CISG as opposed to amalgamating CISG and
domestic law. 12 7 Domestic law may inevitably creep into decisions
involving CISG without regard to the underlying desire of the
CISG drafters to promote uniformity in international private
law. 128

122. See CISG art. 79.
123. CISG art. 79(1).
124. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1995).
125. See supranotes 59-69 and accompanying text.
126. See supranote 63 and accompanying text.
127. In Nuova PucinatiS.P.A. v. Fondmetall InternationalA.B., plaintiff-seller
sued defendant-buyer claiming that plaintiff could not fulfill an injunctive order
mandating it deliver "1000 tons of ironchrome 'Lumpy' as ordered in [the parties]
contract." See Nuova Fucinati S.P.A. v. Fondmetall IntlI A.B., 15 J.L. & CoM. 153
(Alessandra Michelini, trans.) (Fall 1995). Plaintiff argued it could not deliver the
goods because the defendant was late in accepting a separate shipment of
ironchrome "Fine" from plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff argued that fulfilling the
contract would prove "excessive[ly] onerous" since the price of ironchrome
"Lumpy" had greatly risen in the world market. See id.at 154; see also Todd
Weitzmann, Validity andExcuse in the U.N. Sales Convention, 16 J.L. & COM. 265,
282, 288 (1997).
128. See id.
Many of the same international scholars and lawyers
comprising the UNCITRAL group comprise a second intergovernmental group
seeking harmonization of international private law:. the International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). See International Institute for the
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Unification of Private Law: Presentation (visited Nov. 23,
1998)
<http://www.unidroitorg/english/presentation/pres.htn>. The UNIDROIT group
produced the Principlesof InternationalCommercial Contracts (Principles)in 1994.
See Perillo, supranote 114, at 282.
The Principles is not a United Nations Convention ratified by participating
countries as is the CISG, but instead functions as a restatement of international
contract law of sorts. See icl. at 284. The Principleshave been used in a variety of
contexts. For example, one article applauds the use of the Principles "[as a]
[m]odel for national and international legislation ....[as a] [g]uide in contract
negotiations ....[as] [l]aw chosen by the parties to govern their contract ....[as]
[r]ules of law referred to in judicial [and arbitral] proceedings" to interpret
domestic and international law and the law governing the contract. Michael
Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice-The Experience of the First
Two Years (visited Nov. 23, 1998) <http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/
pr-exper.htm>. The latter use of the Principleshas been referred to as "gap filling"
in cases where the CISG or domestic law does not adequately address a particular
dispute. For an analysis of the possibility of the Principles as a "gap filler," see
Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-FillingRole of the UIDROIT Principlesin International
Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay Between the Principlesand the CISG,
69 TUL. L. REV. 1149, 1152 (1995). Most important for this Article, however, is
that, although the UNIDROIT group referenced the CISG when developing the
Principles,there are several differences between the two documents. As Joseph
Perillo writes:
First, [Principles] is far broader in scope [than the CISG]. CISG is limited
to contracts for the sale of goods and furthermore eschews many issues
relevant to sales contracts .... A second departure from CISG is that, to
the extent that the two documents cover the same ground, Principles is a
better, more mature product .... The third departure is that Principles is
not intended for adoption as a treaty or as a uniform law; rather, the
document is in the nature of a restatement of the commercial contract law
of the world.
See Perillo, supra note 114, at 283. Thus, when conducting international
transactions, and anticipating which law will apply, participants in an
international supply chain should first consider the CISG, then the Principles.
The Principles contains two articles dealing with what American law describes
as impossibility. The first is Article 7.1.7, entitled Force Majeure. See UNIDROIT
Principles art. 7.1.7. The language of this article closely resembles that of Article
79 of CISG. The second group of articles dealing with impossibility is Chapter 6,
Section 2, entitled Hardship. See UNIDROIT Principles arts. 6.2.1-6.2.3.
Commentators have analyzed the difference between these two sections and
arrived at the conclusion that Article 7.1.7 and CISG Article 79 are harsher
provisions requiring total impossibility of performance, while the Hardship
provisions embrace a greater variety of contractual difficulties. See Perillo, supra
note 79, at 15.
UNIDROIT presently is drafting a second edition of the Principlesto address
topics "such as agency, assignment of contract rights and duties, limitation of
actions, contracts for the benefit of a third party, set-off and waiver." Id. One
should also note that there exists the Principlesof EuropeanContractLaw, another
restatement of law drafted in 1997 and devised to be applicable to intra-European
contracts. See EuropeanPrinciples of Contract Law, KLUWER LAw INTERNATIONAL
(visited Oct. 26, 1998) <http://www.ljx.com/practice/internat/euro__k.html>; see
also
INT'L
TRADE
L.
MONITOR
(visited
Nov.
17,
1998)
<http://itl.irv.uit.no/tradejaw/>.
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In any event, under the test of the CISG, a party must prove
that: (1) an external impediment to performance occurred; (2) the
impediment was not foreseeable; and (3) the impediment and its
results were unavoidable. 12 9 Each of these terms is taken into
account below.

The

use of the word

"impediment"

is deliberate. 13

Impediment connotes a barrier to contractual performance-as
opposed to a less restrictive term, such as 'circumstances," which
131
might provide for excuse when performance is impracticable.
Additionally, whether there was in fact an impediment is to be
measured objectively.13 2 Keeping in mind that courts may find
domestic law too irresistible to completely eliminate it from
decisions involving the CISG and the Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, a high standard is likely to be applied to a
party claiming excuse: objectively, the impediment must make
performance impossible, this being a standard reminiscent of the
common law doctrine of impossibility. 1 3
The impediment making performance impossible must also
have been unforeseeable at the time of contracting.
This is
measured objectively as well. 1 4 When determining whether the
impediment was unforeseeable, a court should consider the
contract's terms, the contract as a whole, and prevailing trade
practices. 135
Finally, the impediment must have been unavoidable. This
excuse is not available for parties whose culpability brought about
the impediment.1 3 6 This implicates those parties that failed to
address Y2K problems when there remained time to do so.

129.
at 283.
130.

See Jenkins, supra note 35, at 2024-25; Weitzmann, supra note 127,
See Weitzmann, supranote 127, at 283.

When UNCITRAL revisited [the impediment] issue at the Vienna drafting
conferences for the Sales Convention, the provision was changed to
replace 'circumstances' with 'impediment' a term that implies a barrier to
performance. Thus, under the Convention, excuse should apply only to
'impediments' that prevent performance-not to the more wide-ranging
'circumstances' that might make performance merely difficult or
unprofitable.
Id. at 284.
131. Article 79 and Article 7.1.7 are not intended to cover instances where
performance is defective. See Jenkins, supranote 35, at 2024.
132. See Weitzmann, supranote 127, at 284.
133. See id- at 282, 288; Jenkins, supra note 35, at 2025.
134. See Weitzmann, supranote 127, at 286.
135. See icL at 285. Unfortunately, these considerations seem too
amorphous to satisfactorily indicate to a contracting party whether an
impediment is foreseeable.
136. See id at 284.
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The Article now returns to our hypothetical defendant-

sellers. 13 7 Instead of conducting business in America, however,
this section assumes that the defendants are part of an
international supply chain and that all parties involved have their
places of business in different contracting states.

1. Non Y21-Compliant Defendant
The non-compliant defendant will fare about as well under
CISG Article 79 as under U.C.C. Section 2-615. First, the
impediment of Y2K failure may certainly make performance
impossible. However, the Y2K "impediment," as argued above, is
foreseeable. Arguably, a foreign defendant may reside in a country
that is not as Y2K savvy as the United States. Nonetheless, it
appears that Y2K problems are being substantially addressed
throughout the world. 138 Whether Y2K problems will actually be
remedied before January 1, 2000, is another question, but that
does not alter the conclusion that Y2K is a known risk that
parties to an international supply chain need to address.
That Y2K problems may not have been foreseeable at the time
of contracting is an additional wrinkle also previously addressed.
A non-compliant defendant may argue that, at the time the
contract was concluded, Y2K problems were not foreseeable.
However, the CISG requires that the impediment not be due to a
party's action, or in this case, the lack thereof.139
A noncompliant defendant who argues unforeseeability at the time of
contracting is necessarily admitting that Y2K problems, at some
point, became foreseeable. By failing to adequately address these
problems, the non-compliant defendant forecloses the availability
of excuse because the CISG mandates that the "impediment" not
be a result of the party claiming excuse. 14° In this case, the noncompliant defendant essentially caused the non-performance by
virtue of its taking a "wait and see" approach to the Millennium
Bug. Thus, in this instance, the defense of excused performance
cannot succeed.

137.

The subjects of the hypothetical will remain defendant-sellers.

However, buyers may claim excuse under both the CISG and The Principles. As
noted above, the U.C.C. does not allow buyers to claim the § 2-615 defense. See
supranote 47.
138.
See supranotes 2-5 and accompanying text.
139.
See Weitzmann, supranote 127, at 284.
140.
See id.
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2. Y2K-Compliant Defendant
A defendant in a CISG environment that has readied itself for
Y2K faces similar challenges as those presented by the U.C.C. In
our hypothetical, the compliant defendant fails to perform its
contracted-for duties because of upstream collapses in the
international supply chain. The text of CISG directly addresses
this situation. The CISG states:
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom
he has engaged to perform the whole or a part of the contract, that
party is exempt from liability only if(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and
(b) the person whom he has so engaged would be so
exempt if the
14 1
provisions of that paragraph were applied to him.

This provision differs from the U.C.C. in that it does not require
that the third party be an agreed source in the contract. 14 2 It
does, however, require that the faulty third party be in a
"delegated contractual relationship" with the party claiming
excuse.143 Moreover, failure of an upstream general supplier will
not satisfy the conditions of the article. 144 For example, two
arbitration proceedings applying CISG Article 79 have found that
excuse is not available to suppliers when their manufacturers fail
to perform. 145 Therefore, the ordinary participants in a supply
chain will find little relief under the CISG because any upstream
failure most typically will stem from general suppliers.
In the event that the failing upstream supplier is in a
"delegated contractual relationship" with our compliant
defendant, Article 79 states that the party to the contract and the
third party supplier must meet the standards of Article 79(1): (i)
that there was an impediment; (ii) that the impediment was not
foreseeable;
and (iii) that the impediment have been
unavoidable. 146 In this manner, Article 79 burdens the compliant
defendant with the risk that its suppliers will not perform. Even
if the compliant defendant can meet the test set forth, the

141. CISG art. 79(2).
142. CISG art. 79(2); Jenkins, supranote 35, at 2026.
143. CISG art. 79(2).
144. See Jenkins, supranote 35, at 2026.
145. See Russia 16 March 1995 Arbitration proceeding 155/1994 (visited
Nov. 16, 1998) <http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/950316r1.htm1>
(Russian
arbitration proceeding holding that, under CISG Article 79, the seller is not
excused when manufacturer fails to deliver); German 21 March 1996 Hamburg
Arbitration Proceeding (visited Nov. 16, 1998) <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/

cases/960321gl.htm> (German arbitration proceeding holding that, under CISG
Article 79, the seller is not excused when the manufacturer fails to perform).
146. CISG art. 79.
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upstream, non-compliant third party must meet the test as well.
As concluded above, Y2K problems will not allow a non-compliant
party to claim excuse.
This results in essentially a layered
analysis in which the compliant defendant pays the sifts of the
non-compliant parties in the international supply chain.
Therefore, under the CISG, excuse is not available to even a
compliant defendant. 147

147. This analysis assumes that the failing supplier itself was noncompliant; however situations could arise where the failing supplier was
compliant. For example, utilities could fail, forcing industrial shut-downs. In
that event, it appears that the compliant supplier and the compliant defendant
may meet both prongs of the test.
The Principles does not incorporate a section that corresponds to the CISG
Article 79(2). It can be surmised that Article 7.1.7 is intentionally draconian and
that as a result, even a compliant defendant will be hard-pressed to find relief
based on that section. Jenkins, supra note 35, at 2029. However, The Prnciples
contains a section entitled Hardship that should be considered. See UNIDROIT
Principles arts. 6.2.1-6.2.3.
There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the
equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party's
performance has increased or because the value of the performance a
party receives has diminished, and
(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the
conclusion of the contract;
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the
disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the contract;
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and
(d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.
UNIDROIT Principles art. 6.2.2.
If a party can establish hardship, the contracting parties are bound to
renegotiate the contract and, if that fails, may request that a court address the
hardship by altering the terms of or terminating the contract. See UNIDROIT
Principles art. 6.2.3. Hardship does not, however, excuse performance: "[w]here
the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that
party is nevertheless bound to perform its obligations subject to the following
provisions on hardship." UNIDROIT Principles, art. 6.2.1; see also Perillo, supra
note 79, at 21. To meet the requirements of the hardship provisions, a party
must prove (i) hardship; (ii) that the hardship was not foreseeable; (iii) that the
risk was not assumed; and (iv) that the hardship was beyond the party's control
Each element is considered below.
Hardship is a less stringent standard than that of impossibility or
impracticability and can arise in one of two situations. See Perillo, supranote 79,
at 22. First, an exorbitant increase in the cost of performing contractual duties
can constitute hardship. See UNIDROIT Principles art. 6.2.2 cmt. 2. Second, the
value of performance can devalue dramatically for one of the two parties. See id.
Such a change is sufficiently fundamental to constitute hardship where there is a

fifty percent change in the contract's value or value. "If... the performances are
capable of precise measurement in monetary terms, an alteration amounting to
50% or more of the cost or the value of the performance is likely to amount to a
Tundamental' alteration." UNIDROIT Principles art. 6.2.2 cmt. 2; see also Perillo,
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B. Conclusion
This section analyzed the CISG and applied its test of
impossibility to two hypothetical defendants: Y2K-compliant and
non Y2K-compliant. The non-compliant defendant is foreclosed
from using the defense because it did not attempt to achieve
compliance. Therefore, the non-compliant defendant did not
perform in good faith and must pay damages.
The compliant defendant will most likely be found liable as
well for two reasons. First, Y2K and its results are foreseeable.
Second, in a supply chain situation, the compliant defendant
must prove that it and its upstream suppliers meet the test for
impossibility set out in the CISG. Because the compliant party
failed due to the non-compliance of its upstream suppliers, the
defense will necessarily fail. Such a result seems inefficient as it
punishes those compliant parties despite their diligent efforts to
prevent Y2K failure. The next section proposes a different
standard for Y2K cases involving compliant defendants.

V. ADDRESSING THE Y2K QUANDARY
The rules of impossibility and impracticability focus on a single
transaction between individual contracting parties.
This focus

supranote 79, at 22 (citing UNIDROIT Principles art. 6.2.3 cmt. 2). In the case of
Y2K, widespread problems in supply chains may raise prices so severely that the
equilibrium of various contracts involved is "fundamentally alter[ed]." See
UNIDROIT Principles art. 6.2.3. Thus, a failure in a supply chain may result in
hardship for our hypothetical defendants. See UNIDROIT Principles art. 6.2.3.
However, the analysis does not stop with this realization.
A party cannot have assumed the risk of the events causing the hardship.
Under the Princles, a term not explicitly accounted for does not result in the
conclusion that the promisor assumed the risk. See Perillo, supra note 79, at 24.
For example, "the mere fact that the contract contains a fixed price does not
allocate that risk." Id. at 24. This more lenient standard supports the Prncple's
remedy that parties renegotiate when the equilibrium of the contract has been
destabilized.
Additionally, the events causing the hardship cannot have been under the
control of the party claiming hardship. See supra note 22. This obviously
precludes the use of these provisions by our hypothetical non-compliant
defendant due to its culpability in failing to address the Millennium Bug.
However, this element does not foreclose use of the Hardship provisions by the
compliant defendant.
Finally, a party claiming hardship must also prove that the events causing the
hardship were not foreseeable. The standard for foreseeability appears to be
"whether the event was so outside the bounds of probability that reasonable
parties would not provide for it." Perillo, supranote 79, at 23.
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appears sufficient with respect to Y2K non-compliant parties who

failed to address potential Y2K problems. In such a case, the U.C.C.
and CISG appear to foreclose use of excuse due to impracticability or
force majeure. This result is uncontroversial. A contracting party
that does not attempt to perform in good faith should not be allowed

148
the benefits of various defenses to breach of contract.
On the other hand, the compliant defendant in good faith is
one who addressed Year 2000 problems but who fails to perform
because of upstream non-compliance. Under the U.C.C. and
CISG, this upstream failure is a foreseeable risk borne by the
promisor, regardless of the reasons for the upstream failure. 14 9
Because the risk is foreseeable, the compliant defendant bears the
risk and must endure the loss unless the contract specifies
15 0
otherwise.
The foundations for such a rule originate from traditional
contract theory, which favors private ordering as opposed to
judicial intervention upon breach. Andrew Kull, in an article
supporting a "windfall theory" of contract excuse, argues that

allowing parties to form their own contracts without anticipation

of judicial intervention creates incentive for parties to contract
efficiently while avoiding the dead weight loss of ex postlitigation. 151 Additionally, for those risks assumed by neither
148. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995); CISG art. 7(1); see also Richard A. Posner &
Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 98 (1977).
149. See supranotes 80-111, 145 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 80-111 and accompanying text.
151. Kull bases his theory on the idea that, because of the inherent
unforeseeability of the future, every contract is in some part frustrated. "One who

seeks relief from contractual obligation on the ground of mistake or frustration is
complaining that he suffers the disadvantage of an exceptional disparity (called a
'windfall' by Kull), the risk of which was not allocated by the parties." Andrew
Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43
HASTINGS L. J. 1, 4 (1991). If a risk is not allocated in a contract, it should not
matter on which contracting party the resulting burden falls:
As a matter of social utility, excluding for the moment considerations of
fairness, it will ordinarily be a matter of indifference whether the windfall
cost or benefit, once realized, falls to A or to B. Reallocation after the
event thus involves significant administrative costs while achieving no
compelling social advantage.
Id. at 6.
Any judicial reallocation of windfall losses (and gains) results in social
deadweight loss. Therefore, parties should bear these losses without judicial
intervention. Additionally, these windfalls are a result of dickering by the
contracting parties: "The windfall distribution of frustration losses is not
something as to which the parties 'had no will at all'; it is a function of their
agreement and (under a windfall regime) will be the object of more or less
conscious bargaining." Id. at 40 n.145. For a contrasting view, see generally
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (198 1).

1999]

INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND THE Y2K PROBLEM

385

contracting party, the windfall principle lets losses fall where they
may once those risks become realities because social utility does
not prefer that one party bear the loss more than the other.1 5 2 A
choice made by contracting parties not to allocate a particular
risk is a decision unto itself that should be respected without
intervention by the judiciary.1 5 3
Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfield note that failure to
1 4
allocate risk is indeed a decision made by contracting partie& 6
The decision derives from parties' desire to avoid transaction
costs. When contract law provides gap-filers that prove efficient
to a particular contract, parties will opt to let the law control;
when the law proves inefficient, however, parties contract to reach
a more efficient result. s s This conclusion accords with Kull's

hypothesis that parties determine the instances in which contract
law should control, as opposed to tailored contractual terms. The
theories diverge once an unexpected contingency occurs of which
neither party has assumed the risk.
The windfall theory proposes that losses fall where they
may. 156 Posner and Rosenfield present a "superior risk bearer"
analysis in which a court should determine which party is the
superior risk bearer.1 5 7 The loss is therefore allocated to the
party that is in a better position to (1) prevent the risk from
emerging and (2) ensure, either by procuring insurance or by selfinsuring against the risk by spreading costs of the risk through
prices it charges consumers.1 5 8 Allocating loss to the superior
risk bearer thus reaches the most efficient outcome among the
parties and, presumably, in society as well.
Kull observes that the tension between these theories "is
ultimately a moral and political one, between rules that require
people to provide for themselves and rules that permit judges to
intervene when people do not provide for themselves-a

152. SeeKull, supranote 151, at 6.
153. The residual allocation of frustration losses produced by these
devices in the context of a windfall rule is neither artificial nor arbitrary. It
is a result chosen by the parties, not in the tautological sense that it is
demonstrably a function of a privately chosen term but in a broader sense
that allows us to describe its consequences as consciously self-imposed.
Id. at 51.
154. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 148, at 89.
155. See id.
156. See Kull, supra note 151, at 6-7, 41.
157. See Posner & Rosenfield, supranote 148, at 90.
158. See id. at 90-91; see also Barnaby J. Feder, Federal CourtAsked to Rule on
Year 2000 InsuranceDispute, N.Y. TIMES (visited Jan. 11, 1999) <http://www.nytimes.

com.library.tech/98/12/biztech/articles/14bug.html>

(insurance company arguing

that software company's normal business liability insurance does not cover Y2K
glitches in distributed software).
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theoretical struggle between a system based on "individual
autonomy" and a system supporting more societally-oriented
goals, for example the efficiency analysis of the superior risk
bearer.15 9 Posner and Rosenfield also remark upon contract law's
focus on the individual in the context of strict liability and
contract:
This discussion raises the broader question why in general notions
of strict liability seem much more important in contract than in tort
law. The concept of breach of contract is one of strict liability
rather than of negligence. The difference in this regard between
tort and contract law appears to be related to the fact that tort
cases typically involve interactive activities and contract cases
typically do not .... [Iln the typical contract case the only relevant
actors are performer and payor and the productive activity under
16
the contract is controlled and conducted entirely by the former.

0

Posner and Rosenfield contrast elements inherent in contract
and tort law. They conclude that standards such as negligence suit
16 1
tort law because "tort cases typically involve interactive activities."
Conversely, contract cases involve disputes between discrete parties
in activities that are not interactive: "the only relevant actors are
performer and payor.... " 162 The characteristic presumptions of the
respective bodies of law therefore differ:
An automobile accident, for example, is produced by a collision
between two automobiles or between an automobile and a
pedestrian, and there is no presumption that the injurer could
have avoided the accident more cheaply than the victim. But in
the typical contract case ... [tihere is a strong presumption...
that [the promisor] is better able than the payor to prevent a
mishap that will render performance uneconomical. 163

Generally,
such analysis
adequately
delineates
the
boundaries of contract and tort law. However, Y2K and its
consequent results will potentially affect parties and transactions
not only in an individual fashion but globally as well. This flows
from the fact that contracting parties necessarily rely not solely
on the other party to perform but also on third parties. Some
examples of such third parties are governmental agencies and
electric and telecommunication companies. The web that
interlinks humanity in even the most mundane transactions,
such as driving to a grocery store, involves multiple parties with
whom contracting to ensure certainty of a successful transaction
would prove impossible. The trip to the grocery store requires

159.

160.
161.
162.
163.

SeeKull, supranote 151, at 54.
Posner & Rosenfield, supranote 148, at 111.
Id.
Id.

Id.

1999]

INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND THE Y2K PROBLEM

387

that traffic signals work, and that gasoline is available for the car.
It further requires that at the grocery store, running water keeps
vegetables fresh, and electricity provides light and powers cash
registers. 16 4 Such is also the case with a supply chain.
In the typical impossibility case, one of the parties to this web
will fail. However, these instances remain solitary, and most
likely will serve as mere inconveniences.
Electrical outages
generally do not affect enormous geographical areas, and gas
stations abound as do grocery stores. These instances do not
represent global risks but individual ones where substituted
performance is easily attained.
Y2K problems could prove to be more global, with more dramatic
inconveniences. The issues emerge in every aspect of society.
Concerns about health care, transportation, communications,
utilities, and embedded systems universally used in elevators,
pacemakers, and security systems proliferate. The vast and
interdependent web that American and global societies have woven
may fail. For example, the electric supply for an entire state could
1 66
fail,1 63 as could telecommunications and running water.
Interruptions would result, not just in that particular jurisdiction,
but in other jurisdictions as well because of modem commercial and
economic interdependency.
Thus, the risk of Y2K problems presents an individualized
risk assumed by parties demanding that they reasonably address
internal Y2K issues. Y2K also presents societal risks, which
could result in losses society as a whole will bear. The losses may
range from minor frustration to pandemic catastrophe.
Nonetheless, micro-analyzing the results of Y2K complications on
the level of individual contracts loses sight of the forest for the
trees. Contract law's focus on the micro-the individual parties
involved-cannot account for problems occurring in the macro
sense of Y2K. The problems that reasonable, Y2Kcompliant
parties will experience are not autonomous, but instead the result
of interactive activities. Accidents arising out of interactive
activities are judged in tort, not contract. Thus, the Y2K-

164.
(AIRI of modem U.S. society is computer-dependent. (Computers]
keep track of what's on store shelves and how much money is in your
bank account. They control security at nuclear power plants, regulate the
flow of oil through pipelines and distribute electricity across a complex
national grid. They run our trains, traffic signals, telephones, cell phones
and maintain all of our vital records.
M.J. Zuckerman, Y2K: Minor Glitch or Major Disaster?, USA TODAY (last modified
Jan. 7, 1999) <http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cteO68.htm>.
165. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
166.

See supranote 26 and accompanying text.
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compliant party that fails to perform because of external Y2K
complications should be judged from such a standard.
This Article proposes that reasonable victims of Y2K failures
be judged by a negligence standard. Such a standard supports
the outcome of impossibility cases while allowing for flexibility to
address the uriique creature of Y2K. In such a setting, a duty is
imposed on contracting parties to exercise due care in preparation
for the Year 2000. A party that breaches the duty would be liable
for resulting economic damages provided that causation exists.
In our hypothetical cases, the non-compliant Y2K supplier
that ignores the admonishments regarding the Millennium Bug
would be judged to have breached this duty of care. Promisees to
that contract could recover economic damages because causation
in this instance is relatively self-supporting. The Y2K-compliant
supplier, on the other hand, would be discharged of liability
provided that reasonable steps were taken internally prior to the
Year 2000.
Admittedly, the negligence standard presents two difficulties.
First, it ignores the individual autonomy heralded by Professor
Kull and other traditionalists. However, the interactive nature of
American and global society, and the potentially boundless effects
of the Millennium Bug justify a societally-oriented outlook as
opposed to an individually-oriented one. Second, a negligence
standard may encourage litigation. This Article contends,
however, that a negligence standard will not encourage litigation,
but merely shift the parameters from contract cases founded on
Y2K failure to the parameters of tort law. The plaintiffs burden
would be to prove a breach of the duty of care as opposed to
breach of contract.
Conversely, a negligence standard would encourage
commercial parties to internally address Y2K issues while
ensuring them that efforts to comply will not prove futile once
litigation ensues. Because Y2K compliance will be encouraged
under this standard, costs of compliance will be socialized. Prices
may rise slightly while companies internally inventory issues

necessary to address before January 1, 2000, but the costs would
be distributed throughout society. This creates a more efficient
outcome than pure reliance on contract law because a negligence
standard encourages proactive, preventative effort while a
contract standard leaves little flexibility for a Y2K-compliant party
that breaches due to outside, third party mishaps.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Y2K problems at this point in time are reasonably foreseeable
due to the amount of attention given the subject 1 6 7 Contracting
parties should examine potential Y2K problems arising internally
and address them before January 1, 2000. Yet the extent of Y2K
problems, be they widespread or solitary occurrences, remains
unforeseeable and unpredictable.1 68 Even those parties having
adequately addressed internal Y2K problems can experience
difficulties due to external parties having failed to become Y2Kcompliant. This "second tier" of unforeseeability supports the use
of excused performance, but the "first tier" foreseeability that Y2K
problems potentially exist prevent viable use of the defense. In

this sense, this Article suggests that Y2K problems are both
foreseeable and unforeseeable and that a defense more suitable
than contractual excuse be available to those parties acting to
prevent Y2K difficulties.

167.
168.

See supra Part I.
USA Today summarizes Y2K commentators' uncertainties:

The most common scenarios envision the USA facing pockets of shortlived serious hardship and a scattering of annoyances over the next 36
months - death of a thousand cuts by the worst descriptions ....
About
10% of Y2K experts responding to a survey this past spring by the
Washington, D.C., Year 2000 Group, a nonprofit, public-private advisory
panel, said they anticipate major economic disruptions, social upheaval
and martial law. About 1% predict famine and collapse of the U.S.
government. These are the people talking about retreating to rural
compounds with huge stockpiles of survival goods. About 15% of those
surveyed fell short of predicting political crises, breakdown in regional
supply lines and social disruption. In the middle of the survey, experts
say they anticipate at least a 20% drop in stock values (18%), a likelihood
economic slowdown (10%), recession (22%), or perhaps a strong recession
and some social disruption (9%). Only 4% expect no more than
insignificant, local impact. Edward Yardeni, respected chief economist
with Deutsche Bank Securities, predicts a recession on par with the oil
crisis of the 1970s and a 30% dip m the value of the high-flying American
stock markets. All agree that the USA is far better prepared than any
other nation to face the challenge. But remember rule No. 1: No one really
knows what's going to happen ....

Several of the Y2K experts plan to

take some personal precautions, such as setting aside a couple thousand
dollars in cash, and many plan to stockpile several days of essentials. 'My
personal hunch is that there is going to be a fair amount of inconvenience
but not a crisis, that's my personal hunch,' says John Hamre, deputy
secretary of defense, where $2 billion is being spent to tackle the Y2K

problem. But, he admits in a final touch of uncertainty, 'I don't know if
that's my hope or that's my actual conviction.'
Zuckerman, supra note 164. For varying views of Y2K commentators, see the news
clippings at (last visited Feb. 11, 1999) <http://vww.year2000.com/y2kartides.html>.
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In the same vein, this Article recognizes the plight of those
parties that have acted in a timely and prudent manner to avert
Y2K difficulties. Due to the interactive and interdependent nature
of the domestic and global economy, such parties remain at the
mercy of numerous third parties.
This vulnerability is a
necessary element of intranational and international relations,
but it may prove imminently debilitating should contract
performance depend on those numerous third parties. Because
such a web of interrelationships has developed over the centuries,
and because the interrelationships prove vital to performance of
many contracts, the focus of Y2K issues should be societal, not
individual. Contract law's foundation is on "autonomous
individual[s]" while tort law acknowledges those situations where
accidents result from interactive activities. Y2K complications
may disrupt numerous facets of commercial and societal

intercourse, many of which are utterly outside the realm of a
contracting party's control. This realization demands that Y2K
losses be considered in light of tort law as opposed to contract
law.
Judging contracting parties by the strict liability standard of
contract law creates an unsettling uncertainty of performancean uncertainty outside of a party's control because no matter how
effectively the party prepares for Y2K, a third party's failure upon
which the contracting party is dependent will result in strict
liability. Liability hinges on a third party's preparation, a third
party over which contracting parties cannot exercise control. This
uncertainty frustrates the seminal reason supporting contract
theory: certainty in future dealings.
Thus, Y2K's unique
attributes undermine the applicability of contract law.
A negligence standard, however, does provide some certainty
to those parties prepared for Y2K. Judging contracting parties on
a negligence standard, as opposed to the strict liability standard
of contract law, will encourage cost-effective, proactive measures
to remedy Y2K problems before they arise. In other words, by
acting in a timely and reasonable manner, a compliant party can
rest assured that future liability will not negate such efforts. In
so doing, the whole of the planet may be spared from exacerbation
of what may prove to be one of its greatest challenges to date.

